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Building a Better Laboratory: The 
Federal Role in Promoting Health System 
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Abstract 
 
While expanding federal involvement in the health care system, the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) preserves states' roles as 
policy laboratories and private providers' roles as health care delivery 
laboratories.  State-based and provider-based laboratories suffer from many 
shortcomings, however, as mechanisms to develop, evaluate, and facilitate 
diffusion of reforms within the health system.  This Article argues that the 
federal government can take steps to address these shortcomings.  It first 
briefly reviews ACA provisions that promote policy and delivery 
experimentation.  It then suggests that by tying funding to policy outcomes, 
making use of regulatory variation and regulatory menus, and conditioning 
waivers on systematic evaluation, the federal government could further 
improve the performance of the nation as a laboratory. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 766
II. STATES AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS AS LABORATORIES ........................ 769
A. States as Laboratories ............................................................. 770
B. Delivery Systems as Laboratories ........................................... 774
III. BUILDING A FEDERAL LABORATORY .................................................. 776
A. The Problems with State Laboratories .................................... 776
 
 *  Professor of Law and Health Sciences, Northeastern University.  I thank Laura Appleman, 
David Friedman, Rob Gatter, Jesse Goldner, Tim Greaney, Allison Hoffman, Jon Michaels, Efthimi 
Parasidis, Wendy Parmet, David Rochefort, Nic Terry, Sidney Watson, participants in the University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium on the New American Health Care System, and the 
faculties of the law schools of Northeastern University, St. Louis University, UCLA, the University 
of Illinois, and Willamette University for their comments and suggestions.  I also thank Matt Adler 
and Cary Coglianese for many helpful conversations.  
[Vol. 41: 765, 2014] Building a Better Laboratory 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
766 
B. The Problems with Delivery System Laboratories .................. 784
C. The ACA’s Federal Laboratory ............................................... 788
1. Federal Support for Experiments Involving States ........... 788
2. Federal Support for Delivery System Experimentation .... 794
IV. BUILDING A BETTER FEDERAL LABORATORY .................................... 796
A. Policy Incentives ..................................................................... 796
B. Regulatory Variation and Regulatory Menus ......................... 800
C. Conditioned Waivers ............................................................... 806
V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 814
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)1 has the 
potential to completely transform the American health care system.  Easily 
the most significant piece of federal health care-related legislation since the 
adoption of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, it will expand the 
availability of health insurance and change the way that individual and small 
group insurance markets work.  It will also accelerate health care delivery 
reforms.  Whether the ACA achieves its full potential as a transformative 
force, however, remains to be seen.  It may spur more evolution than 
revolution.  Its success and speed in achieving policy goals such as 
expanding access, limiting costs, and improving quality will depend on its 
ability to foster innovation in health care coverage, finance, delivery, and 
regulation. 
The ACA provides an opportunity to study innovation in a context in 
which federal, state, and private actors all play important roles in effecting 
change.  Health care providers continually seek new ways to improve patient 
care.  State governments frequently try out new approaches to expanding 
health care access and regulating health care providers.  At the same time, 
the federal government is increasingly taking responsibility for financing 
health care.  With this increased responsibility has come an increased 
interest in pushing for changes in the health care system.  The ACA 
proceeds even further in this direction.  While preserving important roles for 
states in managing access to the health care system, the ACA relies heavily 
 
 1.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 
1029 (2010). 
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on federal reform as an engine for health system experimentation. 
The term “health system experimentation” is intended to capture many 
distinct but interrelated concepts.  By “health system,” I mean not just the 
health care delivery system, but also the regulatory framework that supports 
it and the policies that shape it.  By “experimentation,” I mean not just the 
initial conception or implementation of a new approach to health care 
delivery or a novel regulation or policy, but also the longer-term processes 
of evaluating and promoting the diffusion of innovations.   
The ACA innovates in many ways.  Just by virtue of its status as a 
newly enacted federal statute, it necessarily engages in policy innovation of 
a sort: it imposes new mandates.  It requires individuals to purchase health 
insurance or pay a penalty,2 requires large employers to provide insurance or 
pay a tax,3 and prohibits insurers from charging higher premiums or refusing 
to issue policies based on individuals’ health status.4  At the same time, the 
ACA seeks to encourage further innovation in both policy and delivery 
through exceptions to its mandates.5  It permits waivers, for example, for 
states that adopt alternative means of ensuring coverage for their residents.6  
It also provides for waivers of certain existing mandates, such as fraud and 
abuse laws that might otherwise impede the development of accountable 
care organizations (ACOs), which policymakers hope will improve the 
quality and efficiency of health care services.7 
Perhaps the most obvious evidence of the ACA’s commitment to 
experimentation is its creation of demonstration projects and new institutions 
devoted to promoting innovation in health care policy and delivery.  For 
example, the part of the legislation entitled “Encouraging Development of 
New Patient Care Models”8 describes a variety of demonstration and pilot 
projects, such as a program under which payments to providers will be 
 
 2.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501, 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2012). 
 3.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1513, 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012). 
 4.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3 (2012) 
(prohibiting exclusion based on preexisting conditions as well as premiums tied to health status). 
 5.  As described in this Article, waivers can be used to promote innovation by removing legal 
impediments.  See infra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.  At the same time, they can be used to 
preserve existing arrangements that do not comply with new requirements; when used in this way, 
waivers can retard innovation.  But even this type of waiver can be viewed as promoting innovation 
if it lowers the costs of transitions or makes the underlying innovative mandate more feasible. 
 6.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1332, 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012). 
 7.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3022, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2012).  
 8.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act tit. III, pt. 3 (2010).  
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bundled so as to encourage more efficient delivery of care.9  The ACA 
establishes the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to administer 
future demonstration projects.  It will have a long-term mission of “test[ing] 
innovative payment and service delivery models to reduce program 
expenditures . . . while preserving or enhancing the quality of care.”10  The 
ACA also establishes the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, 
which will alter the provision of care through research.  Its mission is to 
“assist patients, clinicians, purchasers, and policy-makers in making 
informed health decisions by advancing the quality and relevance of 
evidence concerning the manner in which diseases, disorders, and other 
health conditions can effectively and appropriately be prevented, diagnosed, 
treated, monitored, and managed.”11 
Collectively, these examples demonstrate a much enhanced role for the 
federal government in fostering innovation in health care policy and 
practice.  To some, this enhanced role might seem unusual.  The federal 
bureaucracy is not often thought of as a leading source of innovation.  
Innovation in health care products and services is often thought to be the 
work of private individuals, companies, and provider organizations that, 
inspired by the prospect of financial rewards, professional recognition, or 
healthier or happier patients, find new ways to provide treatment.  
Innovation in health care policy is often thought to be the work of state 
governments.  The metaphor of states as laboratories—generally attributed 
to a 1932 dissenting opinion in which Justice Brandeis noted that “[i]t is one 
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country”12—suffuses 
the health policy literature.13   
 
 9.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3023, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4 (2012). 
 10.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a (2012). 
 11.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301, 42 U.S.C. § 1320e (2012). 
 12.  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  The 
importance of federalism for experimentation was recognized long before this opinion.  Scott L. 
Greer & Peter D. Jacobson, Health Care Reform and Federalism, 35 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 
203, 207 (2010) (“Federalism enables a people to try experiments which could not safely be tried in 
a large centralized country.” (citation omitted)). 
 13.  See generally, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg, Joshua M. Wiener & Michael Housman, State and 
Federal Roles in Health Care: Rationales for Allocating Responsibilities, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH 
POLICY 25–51 (John Holahan, Alan Weil & Joshua M. Wiener eds., 2003); Greer & Jacobson, supra 
note 12; Michael S. Sparer & Lawrence D. Brown, States and the Health Care Crisis: Limits and 
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The question that the ACA raises, then, is what the growing federal 
presence in the health care system means for a process of experimentation 
that has so often occurred at a more granular level.  Part II of this Article 
describes the roles of the federal government, state governments, and health 
care providers in fostering health system experimentation.  It suggests that 
the ACA’s effect is not to displace other actors’ contributions to innovation 
and evaluation, but instead to redirect them.  Part III explores why these 
contributions may be in need of redirection.  It examines factors that 
undermine providers’ efforts to innovate and the shortcomings of the state-
as-laboratory model of policy experimentation.  It then details ways in which 
the ACA addresses these problems.   
Part IV considers steps the federal government might take to build a 
better federal laboratory.  It suggests three broad approaches.  First, the 
federal government could spur more state policy innovation through funding 
programs that provide the same sort of financial incentives to states as those 
currently offered to private health care providers.  Second, the federal 
government could facilitate policy evaluation either by applying different 
rules to different entities (“regulating with variation”) or by offering a 
regulatory menu from which entities could choose.  Finally, it could 
encourage more systematic analysis of innovations by conditioning waivers 
or regulatory exceptions on commitments to practices that facilitate 
evaluation, such as participation in randomized trials.  Part V concludes. 
II.  STATES AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS AS LABORATORIES 
The ACA has been described by its opponents as a “federal takeover” of 
the health care system.14  As a lengthy federal statute focused on health care, 
 
Lessons of Laboratory Federalism, in HEALTH POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN 
STATES 181–200 (Robert F. Rich & William D. White eds., 1996); Charles Barrilleaux & Paul 
Brace, Notes from the Laboratories of Democracy: State Government Enactments of Market- and 
State-Based Health Insurance Reforms in the 1990s, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 655 (2007); 
Howard Leichter, Commentary, State Health Policy Analysis: On the Abuse of Metaphor and the 
Pathology of Variation, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 897 (1997); Michael S. Sparer, Laboratories 
and the Health Care Marketplace: The Limits of State Workforce Policy, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y 
& L. 789 (1997). 
 14.  See, e.g., Sen Hutchison Calls for State Opt Out Amendment to Health Care, KTRE, 
http://www.ktre.com/story/12196113/sen-hutchison-calls-for-state-opt-out-amendment-to-health-
care (last visited Jan. 13, 2014); Robert Pear, States Decide on Running New Pools for Insurance, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/health/policy/30health.html?_r=0 
(quoting Georgia insurance commissioner as describing the high-risk insurance pool as “the first step 
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it certainly increases federal involvement in many aspects of the health care 
system.  As this Part explains, however, the ACA still leaves room for states 
and health care providers to act as laboratories. 
A.  States as Laboratories 
Scholars have devoted considerable effort to analyzing the roles of state 
and federal governments in the development and diffusion of health care 
policy.15  Much of this literature refers to and amplifies upon the Brandeis 
state-as-policy-laboratory metaphor,16 but the meanings that scholars attach 
to the metaphor vary.  Michael Sparer and Lawrence Brown identify four 
“images” of state policy laboratories: 
The first image is state officials and policy analysts working 
together to test theoretical policy hypotheses.  The second is the 
image of states looking at and learning from other states, and 
adapting imported ideas to their own conditions.  The third image 
pictures federal officials adopting national reforms that have been 
pioneered and tested in the states.  The fourth, and most “lab-like,” 
image is that of social scientists studying state policy initiatives, 
 
in the recently enacted federal takeover of the United States health care system”).  
 15.  See generally, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg, Alternative Models of Federalism: Health 
Insurance Regulation and Patient Protection Laws, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY 361–89 
(John Holahan, Alan Weil & Joshua M. Wiener eds., 2003); Howard M. Leichter, State 
Governments and Their Capacity for Health Care Reform, in HEALTH POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND 
THE AMERICAN STATES 151–73 (Robert F. Rich & William D. White eds., 1996); Robert F. Rich & 
William D. White, Health Care Policy and the American States: Issues of Federalism, in HEALTH 
POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN STATES 3–33 (Robert F. Rich & William D. White eds., 
1996); Carolyn Hughes Tuohy, Variation in Health Care Policy in the American States: The Dog 
that Didn’t Bark, in HEALTH POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN STATES 203–17 (Robert F. 
Rich & William D. White eds., 1996); Robert F. Rich & William D. White, Health Care Policy and 
the American States: Issues of Federalism, in HEALTH POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN 
STATES (Robert F. Rich & William D. White eds., 1996); Carolyn Hughes Tuohy, Variation in 
Health Care Policy in the American States: The Dog That Didn’t Bark, in HEALTH POLICY, 
FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN STATES (Robert F. Rich & William D. White eds., 1996); 
Thomas J. Anton, New Federalism and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationships: The Implications 
for Health Policy, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 691 (1997); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Essay, 
Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National Action in Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 844 (2009). 
 16.  See supra note 13. 
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evaluating programs, and suggesting improvements.17  
These four images capture several different ways that states might be 
said to function as laboratories.  First, they share a presumption that at least 
one state is willing and able to adopt an innovative policy.  States cannot 
serve as laboratories unless some are mavericks.  Second, all four images 
include references to testing or evaluation processes of some sort, and the 
first and fourth images highlight these processes.  Finally, the second and 
third images focus on policy transmission.  When one state adopts a new 
policy that appears to achieve some success, its model will be studied and 
may be replicated by other states as well as by the federal government.   
States clearly have the potential to serve all of these functions.  States 
frequently adopt innovative policies; these policies are often assessed in 
some way and then replicated at the state or federal level.  Managed care 
regulations, for example, spread quickly from state to state.18  Key health-
related parts of the federal statutes COBRA19 and HIPAA20 can be traced to 
state initiatives, as can the federal Medigap program21 and the federal 
diagnosis-related group hospital payment method.22  In fact, the ACA can be 
traced to a state program: Massachusetts provided a model for the ACA’s 
state-based exchanges as well as for its individual mandate.23 
The ACA allows state laboratories to continue to operate in this way.  
While it imposes numerous mandates,24 it offers states the flexibility 
 
 17.  Sparer & Brown, supra note 13, at 188–89. 
 18.  See Bovbjerg, supra note 15, at 384. 
 19.  Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 
(1986). 
 20.  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 
(1996). 
 21.  Medigap (Medicare Supplement Health Insurance), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Health-Plans/Medigap/index.html?redirect=/medigap (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2014). 
 22.  See Bovbjerg, supra note 15, at 384 (discussing COBRA, Medigap, and HIPAA); Bovbjerg, 
Wiener & Housman, supra note 13, at 42 (discussing diagnosis-related groups).   
 23.  See generally Kavita Patel & John McDonough, From Massachusetts to 1600 Pennsylvania 
Avenue: Aboard the Health Reform Express, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1106 (2010) (describing 
Massachusetts health reform as a model for national reform).  The Massachusetts health care reform 
that served as a model for the ACA was financed in part through subsidies associated with a federal 
Medicaid waiver, demonstrating how federal efforts to provide flexibility at the state level can 
benefit federal policymakers seeking to design new federal programs.  See id. at 1108 (explaining 
waivers in Massachusetts).   
 24.  See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. 
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necessary for experimentation.25  Rather than creating a single national 
insurance program, it relies on states to implement policies and programs 
that will facilitate access to insurance coverage.26  The ACA increases 
coverage for low-income individuals by retaining and expanding upon 
existing Medicaid programs, which are operated by the states under federal 
guidelines.27  It permits states to design and operate the exchanges through 
which federal subsidies will flow to individual purchasers of insurance 
packages.28  The federal government has now also turned to states to identify 
the essential health benefits that must be included in individual and small 
group insurance products.29  Rather than specify the content of each of the 
ACA’s ten mandated categories of health benefits through federal 
regulation,30 the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has 
allowed states to define essential health benefits based on “benchmark” 
insurance plans offered within the state.31  For each of these examples, the 
ACA and its associated federal regulations will impose some limits on what 
states can do, but states will be permitted to adopt innovative policies within 
these limits. 
The ACA also allows for some state experiments through waivers.32  
Waivers facilitate innovation by freeing interested states from otherwise 
applicable statutory or regulatory requirements, allowing them to try 
different policy approaches.  Some waivers are issued for reasons that have 
little to do with promoting experimentation,33 but others are more clearly 
 
 25.  See New Report Details Affordable Care Act Resources and Flexibility for States, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/ 
02/20110225a.html. 
 26.  See id. 
 27.  See The Medicaid Program at a Glance, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Mar. 4, 2013), 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7235-04.pdf (describing the Medicaid program generally); 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001, 42 U.S.C. 1396 (2012) (mandating expansion of 
the Medicaid program).  
 28.  See generally Jon Kingsdale & John Bertko, Insurance Exchanges Under Health Reform: 
Six Design Issues for the States, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1158 (2010) (describing functions of exchanges). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1) 
(2012) (“essential health benefits”). 
 31.  Additional Information on Proposed State Essential Health Benefits Benchmark Plans, 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-
Resources/ehb.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). 
 32.  See generally Kingsdale & Bertko, supra note 28. 
 33.  A number of ACA waivers appear to be intended to preserve the pre-ACA status quo, rather 
than to support future experimentation.  See Robert Pear, Four States Get Waivers to Carry Out 
[Vol. 41: 765, 2014] Building a Better Laboratory 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
773 
directed at allowing regulated entities to pursue innovations that would 
otherwise run afoul of statutory or regulatory constraints.34  The ACA takes 
this route when it allows states to seek broad waivers of requirements related 
to the operation of state health benefit exchanges as long as they meet 
certain minimum coverage requirements consistent with the ACA and do not 
increase the federal deficit.35  It is not clear how many states will take 
advantage of such a waiver, but it is one that could support future 
experimentation.36 
These are just a few of the many ways in which states continue to have a 
role in shaping health policy and health care delivery under the ACA.  The 
motivation for preserving state flexibility may or may not include a desire to 
promote the development, evaluation, and diffusion of health system 
innovations.  The reasons that the ACA and other federal programs are 
designed to accommodate state flexibility are undoubtedly both numerous 
 
Health Law, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/health/ 
policy/17health.html (describing grant of waivers to Florida, New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee 
permitting insurers to provide plans with coverage more limited than ACA-required levels).  For 
example, HHS has accepted some state requests for waivers of the ACA’s minimum insurance 
coverage requirements, as well as some state requests for adjustments to the federal minimum loss 
ratio, which sets the threshold of medical spending below which insurance companies will be 
required to rebate a portion of premiums to their enrollees.  See id.; Medical Loss Ratios for Health 
Insurance, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/ 
health-insurance-medical-loss-ratios.aspx (last updated June 20, 2013) (explaining loss ratio and 
providing a list of 2011 state waiver applications and results, amongst other information about 
waivers from medical loss ratio requirements); Medical Loss Ratio, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Market-
Reforms/Medical-Loss-Ratio.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2014).  A federal statute mandates rebates in 
the small group and individual markets when medical loss ratios fall below 80%, but allows the 
Secretary to “adjust such percentage with respect to a State if the Secretary determines that the 
application of such 80 percent may destabilize the individual market in such State.”  42 U.S.C. § 
300gg-18(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).  
 34.  In an article from the mid-1990s, Elizabeth Andersen identified three types of Medicaid-
related waivers: “(1) demonstration waivers, permitting short-term experimentation and analysis of 
innovative policies; (2) programmatic waivers, approving particular formulaic, longer-term policy 
changes; and (3) congressionally mandated waivers, implementing express congressional mandates 
regarding particular policy innovations.”  Elizabeth Andersen, Administering Health Care: Lessons 
from the Health Care Financing Administration’s Waiver Policy-Making, 10 J.L. & POL. 215, 216–
17 (1994). 
 35.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1332, 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012) (“Waiver 
for State innovation”).   
 36.  For an argument that this waiver provision is a problematic approach to encouraging state 
innovation, see Stuart Butler, The Wyden-Brown Bill—Short on State Flexibility, 364 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 397 (2011). 
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and varied, reflecting historical, practical, and political factors.  Ultimately, 
however, regardless of its justifications, the ACA’s reliance on state 
involvement in policy implementation leaves room for states to experiment 
and learn from one another’s successes and failures. 
B.  Delivery Systems as Laboratories 
Much of Part II.A’s discussion of state-led health system 
experimentation focused on Title I of the ACA, which contains requirements 
related to health coverage.  Much of health care providers’ discussion of the 
ACA, however, revolves around Title III.  Entitled “Improving the Quality 
and Efficiency of Health Care,” Title III contains a number of provisions 
intended to reform health care delivery.37  While some states have actively 
encouraged delivery reform, states’ laboratory functions tend to be more 
limited in this domain than in the health care coverage domain.38  The 
laboratories that are most prominent in the health care delivery context are 
instead those that belong to health care providers. 
The primary purpose of health care delivery systems is to provide 
medical care.39 But, like states, delivery systems also serve as laboratories of 
policy experimentation in the sense that they sometimes adopt novel policies 
and practices, and the consequences of these reforms are sometimes 
evaluated by those seeking to improve their own policies and practices.40  In 
fact, the parallels between delivery systems and scientific laboratories may 
be closer than the parallels between states and scientific laboratories, given 
 
 37.  For example, Title III’s subtitles include Subtitle A, “Transforming the Health Care Delivery 
System,” Subtitle B, “Improving Medicare for Patients and Providers,” and Subtitle F, “Health Care 
Quality Improvements.”  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010). 
 38.  For examples of some state delivery reform initiatives, see generally S. Comm. on Health, 
Education, Labor & Pensions, Health Care Delivery System Reform and the Patient Protection & 
Affordable Care Act (2012) (report from Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse for the Committee), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Health%20Care%20Delivery%20System%20Ref
orm%20and%20The%20Affordable%20Care%20Act%20FINAL2.pdf; Nat’l Acad. for State Health 
Policy, Re-Forming Health Care Delivery Systems: A Summary of a Forum for States and Health 
Centers 10–16, available at http://www.nashp.org/sites/default/files/hrsa.system.reform.pdf; Nat’l 
Governors Ass’n, State Roles in Delivery System Reform 5 (2010), available at 
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1007DELIVERYSYSTEMREFORM.PDF. 
 39.  See Lower Costs, Better Care: Reforming Our Health Care Delivery System, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/ 
MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-Sheets/2013-Fact-Sheets-Items/2013-02-28.html. 
 40.  See HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM REFORM, supra note 38, at 13–15. 
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the nature of medical practice.  Delivery systems are generally staffed by 
scientifically trained health care providers and are sometimes affiliated with 
academic institutions—thus, delivery systems may sometimes be more 
attentive than state governments to the need to systematically study the 
impact of their reforms. 
Why are health care delivery systems willing to serve as laboratories, 
adopting changes that may then be mimicked by other providers?  First, 
providers may act from a simple desire to improve quality of life, either for 
themselves or for their patients.  Second, physicians and other providers 
working within these systems have a professional obligation to deliver high 
quality care.41  Third, individual and institutional providers may have an 
intrinsic desire to establish a reputation for offering high quality care.   
Finally, providers may respond to outside pressures to alter health care 
delivery.42  The most obvious kind of pressure is direct, command-and-
control public regulation, or private regulation, such as hospital accreditation 
requirements.43  Regulation can promote quality-improving and efficiency-
enhancing change.  But the more prescriptive the regulation is, the less room 
it leaves for future experimentation.  A second form of outside pressure 
arises from market forces.44  Payment mechanisms can be designed to 
reward quality and efficiency, increasing providers’ incentives to reform 
their approaches to health care delivery; competition can further reinforce 
these incentives.45  As long as these payment mechanisms allow for 
flexibility in delivery approaches, they can help to create an environment 
conducive to experimentation.46 
While the federal government does impose some regulations on health 
 
 41.  One description of the principles of medical professionalism refers to the “primacy of patient 
welfare” and the “[c]ommitment to improving quality of care.”  Troy Brennan et al., Medical 
Professionalism in the New Millennium: A Physician Charter, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 243, 
244–45 (2002). 
 42.  See infra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
 43.  See Hospital Accreditation, JOINT COMMISSION, http://www.jointcommission.org/ 
accreditation/hospitals.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2014) (describing hospital accreditation program). 
 44.  See Len M. Nichols, Paul B. Ginsburg, Robert A. Berenson, Jon Christianson & Robert E. 
Hurley, Are Market Forces Strong Enough to Deliver Efficient Health Care Systems? Confidence Is 
Waning, 23 HEALTH AFF. 8, 12 (2004) (discussing the effects of market forces on health care 
providers). 
 45.  See id. 
 46.  See id. 
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care providers participating in federal health care programs,47 federal 
regulators are not permitted to “exercise any supervision or control over the 
practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided” 
or “over the administration or operation” of providers in connection with the 
Medicare program.48  The ACA does not eliminate this restriction.  Instead 
of seeking to change patterns of medical care through direct regulation, it 
puts in place measures likely to encourage providers to alter their 
practices—an approach to health care delivery reform that Part III will 
discuss in more detail.  For the purposes of this Part, the key point is simply 
that the ACA allows for a wide range of provider-initiated innovations in 
health care delivery systems.  It permits provider-based experimentation to 
continue. 
III.  BUILDING A FEDERAL LABORATORY 
Part II of this Article suggested that the ACA takes advantage of states’ 
and health care providers’ traditional roles as laboratories by allowing them 
the freedom to develop innovative policies.  But freedom does not always 
lead to experimentation.  Flexibility permits but does not guarantee 
innovation.  Similarly, flexibility does not guarantee and can even 
undermine the evaluation that is central to experimentation.  This Part argues 
that by addressing weaknesses in the state-as-laboratory model of policy 
development, federal involvement can facilitate more systematic 
development and evaluation of beneficial policies and practices.  At the 
same time, by addressing longstanding weaknesses in health care markets, 
federal involvement can foster greater innovation and evaluation in health 
care delivery.  This Part discusses the steps that the ACA has taken in both 
of these directions, in effect building a federal laboratory that fosters 
experimentation nationwide. 
A.  The Problems with State Laboratories 
Part II argued that the ACA provides the necessary flexibility for the 
policy diffusion contemplated by the state-as-laboratory metaphor.  But the 
fact that states are given flexibility does not necessarily mean they will reach 
 
 47.  See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 482 (2013) (Medicare’s conditions of participation for hospitals).  
 48.  42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012). 
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their full potential as laboratories.49  To some, the laboratory metaphor might 
suggest that as long as states are permitted to innovate, a body of knowledge 
about policy effectiveness will begin to accumulate, just as scientific 
knowledge does.  However, there are many ways in which the process of 
policy development, evaluation, and diffusion differs from the scientific 
process as it occurs in laboratory settings.50  In thinking about the ideal 
federal role in health policymaking, it may be helpful to consider the limits 
to the state-as-laboratory metaphor. 
How do laboratories ordinarily work?  A laboratory is a physical setting 
in which experimentation occurs.51  Scientists formulate hypotheses, design 
experiments to test these hypotheses, and then conduct these experiments in 
laboratories to better control the conditions under which experimentation52 
occurs.  Careful controls help to contain experiments’ effects within the 
laboratory, facilitate efforts to assess the impact of the scientist’s 
interventions, and permit replication of experiments by others.  After 
completing their experiments, scientists evaluate and report their laboratory 
experiments’ results, allowing others to make use of the knowledge that has 
emerged. 
Even this brief description of the process of experimentation suggests 
several ways in which the comparison of a state to a laboratory is inapt.  To 
begin with, states may more closely resemble the scientists in this 
description than the laboratories.  If “state officials and policy analysts 
work[] together to test theoretical policy hypotheses,” as suggested by 
Sparer and Brown’s first image of the state-as-laboratory metaphor, then 
innovative states may act like scientists in the sense that they seek to develop 
knowledge.53  Consistent with this image, states do occasionally engage in 
 
 49.  See discussion infra Part III.A–B. 
 50.  Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 
929, 949 (2011). 
 51.  For a discussion of the nature of experiments, see Sparer & Brown, supra note 13, at 187 
(discussing hypothesis testing in a laboratory setting, including the need for replication); James A. 
Gardner, The “States-As-Laboratories” Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 
475, 480–82 (1996) (discussing scientific experimentation); Peter S. Menell, Regulating “Spyware”: 
The Limitations of State “Laboratories” and the Case for Federal Preemption of State Unfair 
Competition Laws, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1373–75 (2005) (highlighting critical features of 
experimentation). 
 52.  See Gardner, supra note 51, at 480. 
 53.  See Sparer & Brown, supra note 13, at 188–89; see also supra note 17 and accompanying 
text (describing four images of states as laboratories). 
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formal policy experiments in which they test and evaluate the outcomes of 
particular policy approaches.54 
More often, though, when observers refer to states as laboratories, they 
refer simply to situations in which states adopt novel laws or policies.55  A 
state adopting an innovative policy could be analogized to a scientist 
formulating a novel hypothesis, and policy innovation could be analogized 
to hypothesis generation.  But if the state does not then systematically test its 
hypothesis by evaluating the effects of its policy, the comparison between 
the state and scientist fails.  A more appropriate label for the state in this 
scenario may be “experimental subject” or “laboratory rat.”  Each state 
adopting a new policy essentially becomes an observation in a bigger 
experiment that will often involve multiple states.  An outside researcher can 
gather information from innovating states and perhaps from other states in 
an attempt to ascertain the impact of the innovative policies.     
There are a few senses in which states could be said to act as 
“laboratories” rather than as scientists or experimental subjects.  First, if a 
state implements a policy that permits variation across geographic subunits 
such as cities or counties, the state as a whole can serve as a laboratory in the 
sense that its laws, regulations, and other statewide characteristics serve as 
controls for the experiment.  Second, a state might be said to serve as a 
laboratory in the sense that a policy experiment is conducted within it, just 
as a scientific experiment is conducted within a physical laboratory.  In some 
cases, consistent with Justice Brandeis’s view,56 the policy experiment’s 
effects will be contained within the state’s borders, and these effects will 
generate information for outside observers just as laboratory experiments do.   
Sparer and Brown’s four images of the state-as-laboratory metaphor—
images that involve both the testing of policy innovations and their 
subsequent replication—could be said to implicitly capture all these roles for 
states: state as scientist, state as subject, and state as laboratory.57  Indeed, 
 
 54.  See, e.g., Daniel Chandler et al., Client Outcomes in Two Model Capitated Integrated 
Service Agencies, 47 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 175 (1996) (describing and evaluating a pilot program 
that reformed the financing and delivery of mental health services in two California counties). 
 55.  See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of 
Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1676 (2011) (discussing the use of the state-as-
laboratory metaphor in the context of new state immigration laws and policies).  Cunningham-
Parmeter argues that states do not serve as effective laboratories in the immigration context.  Id. at 
1679.  
 56.  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 57.  See Sparer & Brown, supra note 13, at 188–89. 
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the state-as-laboratory metaphor may be used to refer more generally to the 
entire scientific process, including the development of a hypothesis, the 
testing of that hypothesis, and the dissemination of the results of the test.58   
This close examination of the state-as-laboratory metaphor yields two 
benefits.  First, the observation that states may act as scientists or subjects 
rather than laboratories in this process is important because it suggests that 
the “laboratory” label might sometimes be a better fit for the country as a 
whole.  If the nation is a laboratory and individual states are merely 
formulating hypotheses or participating in experiments, then it seems that 
the federal government might have an important role to play in ensuring the 
quality of experimentation.59   
Second, this discussion invites a more careful look at not just the 
similarities between scientific experimentation and policy experimentation, 
but also the distinctions. The distinctions are numerous.60  In fact, the 
distinctions arise even before the experimentation might be said to begin: 
While scientists are rewarded financially and professionally for producing 
knowledge through experimentation, states may not be.  As a result, states 
are not always eager to engage in the innovation that is so integral to 
experimentation.  Researchers have identified many impediments to 
innovation.  Theoretical models suggest that rational politicians may be 
unwilling to undertake risky innovation.61  Governments may be unwilling to 
 
 58.  See Gardner, supra note 51, at 480. 
 59.  Other authors have highlighted the federal role in facilitating experimentation, although they 
offer differing views on that role.  See, e.g., Shannon K. McGovern, A New Model for States as 
Laboratories for Reform: How Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1519, 1549 
& n.169 (2011) (stating that “[o]ne way to conceptualize the federal role is as a laboratory assistant 
who simultaneously observes and provides research support for a number of experiments, drawing 
inferences from the results and serving as an information repository for future experiments,” and 
contrasting that view with another author who advocates for a more expansive role for the federal 
government). 
 60.  For a discussion of the distinctions between policy experimentation and scientific 
experimentation, see David A. Dana, State Brownfields Programs as Laboratories of Democracy?, 
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 86, 97–100 (2005) (describing five elements of laboratory experiments and 
distinguishing them from states’ brownfields programs); Gardner, supra note 51, at 480–82 
(explaining differences between policy and scientific experimentation and observing that the “image 
of scientific experimentation conjured up by the laboratories metaphor is misleading”); Menell, 
supra note 51, at 1373–75 (explaining the scientific method and its inapplicability to experiments in 
internet policy); Sparer & Brown, supra note 13, at 187 (contrasting hypothesis testing in a 
laboratory and in social science work). 
 61.  See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism 
Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980) (analyzing models of political risk taking, 
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engage in full experimentation because doing so would require some of them 
to adopt practices perceived to be less desirable than the status quo or other 
alternatives.62  States have no incentive to take into account the 
informational benefits that their experiments will produce for others.63  
States may ultimately decide that it is better to rely on the results of 
experiments conducted (and funded) by others.  Collectively, these 
considerations imply that states may experiment less than would be socially 
optimal.64 
Abigail Moncrieff identifies another reason that states may not engage 
in policy reform as often as they should: federal programs that help out state 
residents interfere with states’ incentives to innovate.65  When the federal 
government takes on significant financial responsibility for state residents, 
states do not bear the full costs of their policies, and therefore will not reap 
the full financial benefit from reforming those policies.66  As a result, they 
will be less inclined to engage in cost-reducing reforms than would be 
 
including that of a centralized system, a decentralized system, and a “federal” system). 
 62.  See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 
41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 925 (1994); see also Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of 
Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1368–69 
(2009) (discussing situations where states are reluctant to innovate because of a risk of lower returns 
than the status quo); cf. David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism 
and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 566 (2008) (pointing to ethical 
concerns that arise when “some outcomes” of a democratic experiment “may be far more probable 
than others”).   
 63.  In addition, states have little incentive to account for the direct effects of their policies on 
other states.  For a discussion of policy spillovers, see Moncrieff, supra note 15, at 868–72 (2009).  
If the spillovers are positive, states making decisions based purely on their own welfare will 
undersupply reforms relative to the social optimum.  
 64.  Brian Galle and Joseph Leahy, after a thorough review and analysis of the literature on state 
policy innovation, conclude that “there is social underprovision of experimentation by small 
jurisdictions.”  Galle & Leahy, supra note 62, at 1370.  Galle and Leahy examine a number of 
factors that might ensure continued state innovation, including the possibility that states may not be 
able to free ride when there are significant differences in state characteristics, see Galle & Leahy, 
supra note 62, at 1346–61; the possibility that there might be an advantage for the state that adopts 
an innovative policy first, id. at 1361–67; and the possibility that the differences in state policy goals 
and risk preferences will generate policy diversity, id. at 1369.  They nevertheless reach the 
conclusion that policy experimentation will be undersupplied relative to the social optimum.  Id. at 
1398.   
 65.  See generally Moncrieff, supra note 15 (discussing implications of federalization). 
 66.  See id. at 847 (“While a given state fully internalizes the benefits of inefficient malpractice 
laws, that state does not bear the full cost of the inefficiencies.  Instead, it externalizes a significant 
(and ever-growing) portion of those costs onto the federal government and, by extension, onto the 
other forty-nine states.”); id. at 847–48. 
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efficient.  Moncrieff illustrates this point with the example of medical 
malpractice.  She argues that because the federal government funds health 
care through Medicare, Medicaid, tax breaks, and other programs, states are 
able to externalize the costs associated with their medical liability systems 
onto the federal government (such as the costs associated with defensive 
medicine).67  For this reason, she argues, the federal government should take 
a more active role in malpractice and patient safety reform.68  The same 
argument could be applied to any reform with health care cost implications, 
including state reforms of laws, regulations, and policies regarding health 
care cost, quality, and access.  In short, federal involvement in financing 
health care means that states have suboptimal incentives to implement cost-
reducing reforms. 
Even when a state does choose to innovate, it may not produce 
knowledge that benefits other states.  While scientific experiments are 
designed to generate knowledge by answering specific questions, states most 
often design and implement innovative policies in the hope of achieving a 
desired policy objective.69  The goal of generating new knowledge is often 
secondary, if it exists at all.70  A number of commentators have observed that 
states have little incentive to structure their policy experiments in ways that 
will generate data useful for other states.71 
Even if a state is willing to share its data, the data may not reveal much 
about the impact of the program.  The fundamental problem is that policy 
innovation does not take place within a laboratory, but within the real world, 
where it is difficult to implement adequate controls.  Without adequate 
controls, researchers may not be able to determine whether an outcome 
resulted from the experimental intervention or from an unrelated variable. 
Unable to directly control the environment in which an experiment 
occurs, social scientists have turned to a variety of methods to try to sort out 
causation.  Occasionally, they test policies through randomized controlled 
 
 67.  See id. at 848–50 (summarizing argument). 
 68.  See id. at 882–89 (proposing types of federal involvement). 
 69.  See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 51, at 480–81 (describing goals in policy experimentation). 
 70.  See id. at 481–82. 
 71.  See, e.g., Galle & Leahy, supra note 62, at 1351 (“As [Rose-Ackerman] points out, 
information about an experiment that might prove useful to others is typically an externality for the 
experimenter.” (footnote omitted)); Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The Positive Case for 
Centralization in Health Care Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20 KAN. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 266, 277 (2011); Rubin & Feeley, supra note 62, at 926. 
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trials.72  More often, though, empirical researchers take advantage of natural 
experiments, tracking policies adopted by states and the possible outcomes 
the policies might influence.73  They may compare the outcomes of 
individuals affected by a new policy to those of individuals not affected by 
the policy.  Researchers can also use statistical techniques to control for 
other state-related factors that contribute to policy outcomes.   
Applying these techniques in the policy setting can be challenging.  
Real-life reforms may be adopted after a change in conditions within the 
state, complicating efforts to distinguish the effects of the reform from the 
effects of the changed conditions.  They may also involve multiple 
simultaneous innovations, complicating efforts to disentangle the impacts of 
each of the individual innovations.  And while many analysts use regression 
techniques to control for state factors that might affect policy outcomes, the 
more relevant state factors that exist, the less successful this approach is 
likely to be; at some point, the number of relevant factors overwhelms the 
number of data points available to pin them down.74  In an article advocating 
randomization of law, Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres, and Yair Listokin 
identify a number of problems associated with regression analyses, including 
omitted variable bias, which occurs when models omit factors that contribute 
to policy results, leading researchers to make incorrect inferences about the 
impact of the policy itself.75  As the authors observe, “[t]he difficulties that 
social scientists and especially policymakers face in assessing the results of 
state innovations contribute to the inaptness of the states-as-laboratories 
metaphor.”76  
 
 72.  See DAVID GREENBERG ET AL., SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICYMAKING 
37–40 (2003) (noting a decrease in federal funds and an increase in state funds for social 
experiments); Abramowicz et al., supra note 50, at 948 (noting that “randomized experiments have 
increasingly been conducted within states”). 
 73.  See Michelle M. Mello & Kathryn Zeiler, Empirical Health Law Scholarship: The State of 
the Field, 96 GEO. L.J. 649 (2008) (reviewing methods for studying the impact of health law); Ryan 
W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 24 
(2010) (“Unlike a controlled experiment, in which researchers themselves change a condition to 
study its effects, a natural experiment examines the effects of exogenous changes that occur in the 
world without any prompting by researchers, such as the enactment of a new law or a series of 
Supreme Court decisions.”). 
 74.  See Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 71, at 276–77 (citing “demographic and sociological 
diversity among the states” as the biggest limit “to the usefulness of state-based experiments”). 
 75.  See Abramowicz et al., supra note 50, at at 938–48.  They also discuss problems of 
publication bias and model misspecification.  See id. at 943–46. 
 76.  Id. at 947. 
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In addition, idiosyncratic variations in policies preclude straightforward 
inferences about the effects of particular policy approaches.  Robert Hurley 
and Stephen Zuckerman’s discussion of federal waivers in the context of 
innovations in state Medicaid operations illustrates this problem.77  In the 
1980s and 1990s, many states sought “Section 1115” waivers of certain 
federal requirements in order to implement reforms in their Medicaid 
programs.78  The waiver program attempted to overcome any reluctance 
states might otherwise have to share relevant information with others by 
imposing “detailed reporting and oversight requirements . . . designed to 
facilitate research and evaluation, thus generating knowledge.”79  However, 
by 1997, “[w]hile some new programs maintained a semblance of their 
original research and demonstration function, waivers increasingly 
authorized highly idiosyncratic models of reform and programmatic 
changes.”80   
Section 1115 waivers continue to provide an important outlet for state 
innovation and variation, supporting expansions in Medicaid coverage, 
modifications to payment mechanisms, and changes in delivery systems.81  
The more idiosyncratic and varied the models that Section 1115 waivers 
support, however, the harder it will be to establish the models’ effects.  In 
essence, the same flexibility that fosters innovation undermines evaluation.   
In a more constrained world, there might be more examples of a 
particular type of innovative model.  An increased number of observations 
may enhance researchers’ ability to separate the effects of the model from 
the effects of other factors that might contribute to policy outcomes.82  The 
Section 1115 programs may be effective demonstration programs in that 
 
 77.  Robert E. Hurley & Stephen Zuckerman, Medicaid Managed Care: State Flexibility in 
Action, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY 215, 220–22 (John Holahan, Alan Weil & Joshua M. 
Wiener eds., 2003). 
 78.  Id. at 221. 
 79.  Id.  On the nature and use of Medicaid waivers under Section 1115 of the Social Security 
Act, see Madhu Chugh, Executive Authority to Reform Health: Options and Limitations, 37 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 22, 25 (2009) (stating that as of January 2007, there were 110 Medicaid and SCHIP 
Section 1115 waivers and that fourteen million beneficiaries received coverage through waiver 
programs).  See generally Andersen, supra note 34 (describing Medicaid waiver programs). 
 80.  Hurley & Zuckerman, supra note 77, at 222. 
 81.  See Five Key Questions and Answers About Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. (June 30, 2011), http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/five-key-questions-and-
answers-about-section/.   
 82.  See Hurley & Zuckerman, supra note 77, at 227–30. 
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they permit observers to assess whether states can overcome the logistical 
challenges of implementing new policies.83  Administrators can share their 
views about aspects of the program that seem to work well and aspects that 
do not.  The programs are less well suited, however, to systematic, 
comparative evaluation.     
Admittedly, policy evaluation does not always require randomized 
controlled trials.  Books on program and policy evaluation are filled with 
advice on how to assess policy implementation in real-world settings, and 
the randomized controlled trial is just one of many options.84  All are 
consistent with Sparer and Brown’s fourth image of states as laboratories, 
which involves “social scientists studying state policy initiatives, evaluating 
programs, and suggesting improvements.”85  At the same time, however, the 
many limitations to these methods collectively mean that while states may 
try to learn from one another’s experiences, they will often need to confront 
challenges that laboratory scientists do not face.  The question, then, is 
whether increased federal involvement can help address these challenges.    
B.  The Problems with Delivery System Laboratories 
Health care providers, like states, occasionally engage in 
experimentation.  Hospitals, physicians, and other providers may innovate in 
the delivery of care, just as states may innovate in their financing or 
regulation of health care.86  Hospitals may act like scientists, conducting 
studies in order to assess the impact of internal delivery reforms, or like 
experimental subjects, participating in multi-institutional experiments 
evaluated by outside researchers.  Hospitals sometimes act as laboratories in 
 
 83.  See id. 
 84.  See, e.g., CAROL H. WEISS, EVALUATION 180–93 (2d ed. 1998) (describing different 
methods for evaluating programs and policy processes and outcomes).  Both the approaches to 
evaluation and evaluation goals are highly varied.  See MELVIN M. MARK, GARY T. HENRY & 
GEORGE JULNES, EVALUATION: AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING, GUIDING, 
AND IMPROVING POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 97 (2000) (describing the relationship between four 
“inquiry modes” of evaluation, “description,” “classification,” “causal analysis,” and “values 
inquiry,” and three purposes of evaluation, “oversight and compliance,” “program and organizational 
improvement,” and “knowledge development.”).  The limitations of states as laboratories may 
undermine some evaluation forms more than others.  
 85.  Sparer & Brown, supra note 13, at 188–89. 
 86.  See David M. Cutler, Where Are the Health Care Entrepreneurs? The Failure of 
Organizational Innovation in Health Care 15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
16030, 2010). 
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the sense that they supply the setting for delivery reform innovation within 
their own walls.  In all of these ways, delivery system laboratories could be 
said to resemble state laboratories. 
Delivery systems laboratories also resemble state laboratories in that 
they may face suboptimal incentives to innovate.87  Hospitals’ incentives to 
innovate are likely weaker than those of for-profit entities in other 
industries.88  Typically, for-profit producers engage in revenue-enhancing or 
cost-reducing innovations because doing so generates profits.  When they 
find a way to increase the quality of a good, they may be able to raise prices 
and attract more customers; if they reduce production costs, they can 
undersell their competitors.  Competitors facing a loss in customers may 
then respond with innovations of their own.  The potential for profit 
associated with an innovation obviously depends on many factors, including 
the nature of the innovation and the nature of the underlying market, but the 
central point is simply that in many industries, innovation can lead to higher 
rewards. 
Like providers of other goods and services, health care providers can 
and do innovate in quality-enhancing and cost-reducing ways.  Physicians 
have a professional obligation to improve the quality of care for their 
patients, and health care providers must find ways to keep costs below 
reimbursement levels in order to remain afloat.  But the characteristics of 
health care markets weaken the financial incentives that would otherwise 
exist for health care innovation.89  One cause of market imperfections is the 
lack of information about health care quality.90  Patients can judge the 
convenience and attractiveness of a facility, the attentiveness of providers, 
and certain other aspects of the care they receive.  Patients are often not able 
to assess the clinical quality of their care, however.  They generally cannot 
independently determine whether a provider’s treatment recommendation 
was consistent with current medical knowledge, whether the outcome they 
experienced was due to the care delivered, or whether the outcome would 
 
 87.  See generally Sparer & Brown, supra note 13. 
 88.  See Laura Landro, The Time to Innovate Is Now, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2011), 
http://on.wsj.com/1e6jSHK (“Unlike many other industries, health care has remained highly 
fragmented, with a hierarchical culture resistant to change, and a payment system that rewards 
providers for quantity rather than quality of care.”). 
 89.  The health economist David Cutler points to two factors that impede organizational 
innovation in health care: “lack of good information on quality” and “the stagnant compensation 
system of public insurance plans.”  Cutler, supra note 86, at 3. 
 90.  See id. 
[Vol. 41: 765, 2014] Building a Better Laboratory 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
786 
have been better if another type of treatment had been given.  Unless they 
find a way to overcome this information deficit, health care providers who 
do improve their quality may not be rewarded with an influx of patients.91 
Providers who improve their quality may not be rewarded with higher 
prices, either.  Patients are probably not willing to pay higher prices for an 
improvement in quality they cannot assess.92   But even if they were willing 
to pay the higher price, it is often not the patient who pays the provider, but 
the patient’s insurer.93  Historically, payers have not been much better 
positioned than patients to assess quality and have not adjusted their 
payments to account for quality, instead paying fixed fees for whatever 
services were provided.94   While a reputation for providing high quality care 
might generate bargaining power that translates into higher fees, such as 
when an insurer’s customers insist that a particular hospital system be 
included in an insurer’s network, this link between payment and quality is 
indirect and would be unlikely to strongly incentivize delivery innovations 
across a range of hospitals.95  Without more direct ties between payment and 
quality, the financial incentive to engage in quality-enhancing innovation 
will be limited. 
The nature of health care markets also limits provider incentives to 
innovate in cost-reducing ways.  Health care providers face pressure to 
control costs for each service they provide, but this pressure may not extend 
to controlling total costs of treatment for a patient.  Many service providers 
are compensated on a fee-for-service basis,96 which means that as long as the 
compensation level is sufficiently high, they can increase profits by 
providing more services.  Thus, while they have an incentive to economize 
on the costs of providing a given service, they might not have an incentive to 
reduce the number of services they provide.97  Thus, current payment 
 
 91.  See id. 
 92.  See id. 
 93.  See id. at 25. 
 94.  See id. at 3. 
 95.  See id. at 21–22. 
 96.  See id. at 20. 
 97.  In addition, hospitals seeking to reduce costs face a further challenge: The physicians who 
make many decisions that influence hospitals’ costs are often independent of the hospital and not the 
hospital’s employees.  See Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the 
Medical Marketplace, 66 MO. L. REV. 341, 356–59 & n.78 (2001) (“Physicians influence or control 
approximately seventy-five percent of health care spending through their practice patterns.”); id. at 
n.78 (noting that “physicians are usually independent contractors, rather than employees” of 
[Vol. 41: 765, 2014] Building a Better Laboratory 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
787 
practices impede robust competition based on the total costs of treatment. 
Other factors that might hinder innovation include the lack of provider 
competition in some markets and, in more competitive markets, the 
difficulty of preventing competitors from duplicating a successful 
innovation.  Complex regulations can also slow innovation in the health care 
industry, as they do in other industries.98  This partial list of barriers to health 
care delivery innovation hints at the magnitude of the difficulties involved in 
reforming the health care system.  Delivery experiments, like state policy 
experiments, can be difficult to get started. 
Some of the same problems that plague efforts to evaluate and 
disseminate information about state policies also appear in the health care 
delivery setting.  An innovative hospital may have little incentive to share 
the evaluation of its results with other hospitals, for example.  In addition, 
the same factors that impede innovation may reduce providers’ commitment 
to evaluation.  Evaluation will generate little financial return unless it is 
essential for making delivery changes that improve net revenues.  If the 
nature of health care markets precludes such rewards, then other incentives 
must be used to support evaluation.   
It is true that some aspects of the delivery system culture may make 
evaluation and information dissemination occur more readily in health care 
delivery than in health care policy.  For example, by their very nature, 
teaching hospitals combine health care delivery with teaching and research 
functions; they may therefore be more inclined to systematically study the 
impact of health reforms.  Nevertheless, the impediments to evaluation in the 
health care provider setting suggest that flexibility will not necessarily lead 
to full experimentation.     
Thus, the shortcomings in delivery system experimentation raise the 
same question as the shortcomings in state experimentation: Can increased 
federal involvement in the health care system improve health system 
experimentation? 
 
managed care organizations).  See generally Mark Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: 
Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (1988).  This 
independence restricts hospitals’ ability to implement innovations that would reduce their own costs.  
See generally Hall, supra note 97. 
 98.  See Regina A. Herzlinger, Why Innovation in Health Care Is So Hard, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(2006), http://hbr.org/web/extras/insight-center/health-care/why-innovation-in-health-care-is-so-hard 
(noting that sometimes government regulation can hinder innovation in health care). 
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C.  The ACA’s Federal Laboratory 
Many of the ACA’s provisions evidence a commitment to expanded 
federal involvement in health system innovation and research.  For example, 
the ACA creates the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute to 
“advanc[e] the quality and relevance of evidence concerning the manner in 
which diseases, disorders, and other health conditions can effectively and 
appropriately be prevented, diagnosed, treated, monitored, and managed.”99  
But the ACA also contains a number of more targeted federal initiatives that 
appear designed to address some of states’ and providers’ shortcomings as 
laboratories, facilitating future experimentation.  This subpart discusses 
these initiatives.  
1.  Federal Support for Experiments Involving States 
As illustrated in Part III.A, the weaknesses of the state-as-laboratory 
model of policy experimentation include states’ reluctance to innovate, their 
disinclination to develop and share information when they do innovate, and 
their tendency to adopt highly varied policies that have the effect of 
obscuring the relationship between policy features and policy outcomes. 
The ACA works to overcome states’ suboptimal incentives to innovate 
in two ways: mandates and subsidies.  If the federal government sought to 
increase access to care by enacting a single-payer system or requiring that 
everyone purchase individual insurance from a nationally regulated insurer, 
there would be little reason or room for states to find innovative ways to 
increase access.  But, as discussed in Part II, the ACA preserves a significant 
role for states in increasing their residents’ access to care.  For example, 
under the ACA, states will develop and operate health benefit exchanges 
through which individuals and small businesses will be able to purchase 
health insurance.100  By defining basic features of the exchanges, but leaving 
states much discretion with respect to exchange operations, the ACA will 
tend to engender variation in state approaches and leave room for state 
innovation. 
The federal government has also provided financial support to states 
seeking to innovate in connection with the ACA.  By lowering the cost of 
 
 99.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301, 42 U.S.C. § 1320e (2012). 
 100.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) 
(2012). 
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innovation, the ACA helps promote innovation.101  The ACA provides grants 
for states to use in the development of exchanges,102 and HHS gave “Early 
Innovator” grants to support states’ efforts to build the information 
technology infrastructure of these exchanges—infrastructure that could then 
be “adopted and tailored by other states.”103  Rewarding early innovators in 
this way incentivizes greater production of innovation and encourages faster 
dissemination of information.  The ACA also subsidizes state innovation 
through funding for demonstration programs operated at the state level.  For 
example, it authorizes funding for state demonstration projects involving the 
“development, implementation, and evaluation of alternatives to current tort 
litigation for resolving disputes over injuries allegedly caused by health care 
providers or health care organizations.”104 
While funding for demonstration projects clearly plays an important role 
in supporting state innovation, so does the mere existence of federally 
defined demonstration projects.  Federal demonstration projects involving 
states are perhaps the clearest example of a federal laboratory at work.  The 
constraints fashioned by the federal government to define demonstration 
projects focus states’ attention on particular goals and mechanisms for 
achieving those goals.105  In essence, the constraints determine the 
hypothesis to be tested.  The constraints also facilitate efforts to test the 
hypotheses by permitting more systematic evaluation of the impact of 
innovations that states adopt.106  In these ways, the impact of demonstration 
projects can extend beyond what might be achieved by simply permitting 
 
 101.  Analysts who recognize that states may have suboptimal incentives to innovate have 
suggested awarding prizes to encourage further innovation.  See Galle & Leahy, supra note 62, at 
1361 (citing Rose-Ackerman, supra note 61, at 615–16, for the observation “that a centralized 
planner can prompt innovation by offering grants or prizes to local innovators, presumably in 
amounts tied to the approximate size of the externality they produce,” as well as other sources’ ideas 
for rewarding local experimentation).   
 102.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311(a), 42 U.S.C. § 18031(a) (2012). 
 103.  See States Leading the Way on Implementation: HHS Awards “Early Innovator” Grants to 
Seven States, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Feb. 16, 2011), 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/02/20110216a.html. 
 104.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10607, 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15 (2012). 
 105.  See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State 
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 589–92 (2011). 
 106.  Cf. Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 71, at 283 (arguing that “fully nationalizing” Medicaid 
funding under the ACA, which was not done, would have replaced “haphazard[]” state 
experimentation with “a thoughtfully structured process to produce and replicate good policy 
nationwide”). 
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states the flexibility to innovate.107 
A number of commentators have recognized both the potential 
contributions of states that innovate and the potential benefits of the 
involvement of some centralized authority in coordinating states’ efforts.  
Rubin and Feeley, for example, note that a central authority seeking to 
determine which policy would achieve a particular objective could “order 
different sub-units to experiment with different strategies until the best way 
to achieve the goal emerges.”108  This approach would use a mandate to 
overcome states’ reluctance to innovate, while at the same time permit more 
systematic evaluations of policies than is possible when states innovate in an 
ad hoc way.109  Abramowicz, Ayres, and Listokin similarly envision a 
regime in which governments could operate experiments across geographic 
areas.  They argue that “government should embrace randomized trials of 
statutes and regulations as a tool for testing the effectiveness of those 
laws”110 and note that “it may be possible to randomize policies across states, 
at least among states that consent.”111   
As the ACA illustrates, however, the federal government is more likely 
to turn to demonstration programs or pilot projects than to randomized 
controlled trials as a way of advancing experimentation.112  For example, 
under one demonstration program, state Medicaid programs will use bundled 
payments to pay for the care of beneficiaries.113  States seeking to participate 
in the demonstration must specify the episodes of care and specific services 
to be included in the program, but the Secretary is permitted to modify these 
parameters and to vary them across participating states.114  In other words, 
 
 107.  See Gluck, supra note 105; Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 72, at 283. 
 108.  Rubin & Feeley, supra note 62, at 924. 
 109.  See generally Rubin & Feeley, supra note 62, at 924 (explaining why federalism is not 
conducive to scientific experimentation and the kinds of coordination that would be necessary to 
engage in robust experimentation).  They conclude that “[i]t is thus hardly surprising, even given the 
most favorable assumptions about the rationality and conscientiousness of state governments, that 
most significant ‘experimental’ programs in recent years have in fact been organized and financed 
by the national government.”  Id. at 925.   
 110.  Abramowicz et al., supra note 50, at 933. 
 111.  Id. at 948. 
 112.  Federal regulatory experiments do sometimes occur; Abramowicz, Ayres, and Listokin have 
discussed an example involving the Securities and Exchange Commission.  See Abramowicz et al., 
supra note 50, at 988–91.   
 113.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2704 (“Demonstration project to evaluate 
integrated care around a hospitalization”), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a note (2012). 
 114.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2704(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a note (2012). 
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states are permitted to innovate, but the federal government may impose 
constraints that could be used to improve the quality of experimentation.115 
Other state-based demonstration projects involve Medicaid global 
capitation payments to safety-net hospitals,116 malpractice liability reform,117 
and insurer-sponsored wellness programs.118 
The ACA did not invent the demonstration project—demonstrations 
have long been used as mechanisms to test new approaches to health system 
reform.119  The ACA took a clear step toward supporting greater growth in 
demonstration projects, however, by establishing the Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Innovation (CMI), which will “test innovative payment and 
service delivery models to reduce program expenditures . . . while 
preserving or enhancing the quality of care”120 and by appropriating ten 
billion dollars for its operations from 2011 to 2019.121  This dedicated 
funding will substantially increase the federal government’s ability to 
conduct policy experiments.122 
Perhaps equally important, the ACA grants the HHS Secretary 
 
 115.  See, e.g., id. 
 116.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2705 (“Medicaid Global Payment System 
Demonstration Project”), 42 U.S.C. § 1315a note (2012).  
 117.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10607 (“State demonstration programs to 
evaluate alternatives to current medical tort litigation”), 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15 (2012). 
 118.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2705(1) (“Wellness Program Demonstration 
Project”), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (2012). 
 119.  See, e.g., COMM. ON RAPID ADVANCE DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS: HEALTH CARE FINANCE 
& DELIVERY SYS., BD. ON HEALTH CARE SERVS., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., FOSTERING 
RAPID ADVANCES IN HEALTH CARE: LEARNING FROM SYSTEM DEMONSTRATIONS (Janet M. 
Corrigan, Ann Greiner & Shari M. Erickson eds., 2002), available at  http://faculty.law.miami.edu/ 
mcoombs/documents/CoombsFosteringRapidAdvancesinHealthCare.pdf (proposing a series of 
demonstration projects involving primary care delivery information technology, insurance coverage, 
and state liability reform). 
 120.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(a)(1) (2012).  
The mission of CMI is to “produce better experiences of care and better health outcomes for all 
Americans at lower costs through improvements.”  Karen VanLandeghem, Innovation Center 
Established to Improve Health Outcomes and Reduce Costs, ASS’N OF MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH 
PROGRAMS, http://www.amchp.org/AboutAMCHP/Newsletters/Pulse/Archive/2011/March2011/ 
Pages/Feature3.aspx (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).  See generally The CMS Innovation Center, CTRS. 
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., innovations.cms.gov/ (last visted Jan. 17, 2014). 
 121.  See VanLandeghem, supra note 120; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 
U.S.C. § 1315a(f) (2012). 
 122.  See Robert Mechanic & Stuart Altman, Medicare’s Opportunity to Encourage Innovation in 
Health Care Delivery, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 772, 773 (2010) (noting the importance of the large 
appropriation for effective operations). 
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significant authority in managing demonstration projects—authority that 
may increase the projects’ ultimate impact on policy.123  Historically, 
demonstration projects have been challenging to initiate because they require 
political as well as financial support to create and administer.124  Given the 
time-consuming nature of project approval, creation, operation, and formal 
evaluation, many years may pass between the initial conception of a project 
and the reporting on its results, potentially limiting the usefulness of the 
project.125  Even when projects seem to have been successful, Congress has 
not always responded by making policy changes.126 
Policy analysts suggest that the ACA may help to address these 
problems.127  First, under the ACA, the Secretary would have the authority to 
select particular models to be tested from a group of models that “address[] a 
defined population for which there are deficits in care leading to poor 
clinical outcomes or potentially avoidable expenditures.”128  This authority 
allows the Secretary the freedom to direct government resources toward the 
reform approaches deemed to be the most promising in the current 
environment, rather than being restricted to focusing on specific statutorily-
mandated projects.129  Second, the ACA prohibits the Secretary from 
 
 123.  See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1) (2012). 
 124.  See Michael S. Barr et al., Lessons for the New CMS Innovation Center from the Medicare 
Health Support Program, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1305, 1305 (2010) (noting that “CMS already has the 
authority to conduct demonstrations and pilot programs” but that “the agency’s activities to date 
have been limited by a host of political, legal, and budgetary constraints”); William M. Sage, Why 
Are Demonstrations of Comprehensive Malpractice Reform So (At All) Controversial?, 37 U. MEM. 
L. REV. 513, 526 (2007) (discussing barriers to creating federal malpractice demonstration projects). 
 125.  See Stuart Guterman et al., Innovation in Medicare and Medicaid Will Be Central to Health 
Reform’s Success, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1188, 1190 (2010) (discussing the lengthy timelines involved in 
typical demonstration projects). 
 126.  See Mechanic & Altman, supra note 122, at 772 (describing congressional failure to expand 
Medicare’s bypass surgery global fee demonstration).   
 127.  See Barr et al., supra note 124, at 1305 (stating that the ACA “strengthens the CMS’s 
authority and capacity to foster innovation” and “addresses some of the historical boundaries placed 
on the agency”). 
 128.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(a)(1) (2012). 
 129.  See Chris Fleming, Health Affairs Blog Roundtable Transcript: CMS and Health Reform, 
HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Apr. 29, 2010), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/04/29/health-affairs-blog-
roundtable-transcript-cms-and-health-reform/ (quoting Bruce Vladeck, former administrator of the 
Health Care Financing Administration, as saying that “for the first time really since the early 1980s 
CMS is going to have the resources to essentially do noncongressionally mandated experimentation 
and program development”); Mechanic & Altman, supra note 122, at 773 (contrasting CMI’s “broad 
authority to select the programs best suited to its objectives” with “CMS’s Office of Research, 
Development, and Information,” which “has far less flexibility, because a large proportion of its 
[Vol. 41: 765, 2014] Building a Better Laboratory 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
793 
requiring models to be budget neutral during the initial testing phase; 
neutrality requirements had hampered previous demonstrations.130  Third, the 
ACA requires the Secretary to terminate or modify models in some 
circumstances,131 a requirement that analysts suggest “gives the CMS greater 
flexibility to design and develop new models.”132  At the same time, the 
ACA allows the Secretary to expand the duration and scope of the model in 
other circumstances,133 which will facilitate quicker and more widespread 
adoption of successful pilot programs.134  Thus, CMS and its demonstration 
projects will likely play an even more important role in the future in 
fostering innovation across states and across delivery systems.135 
Waivers and demonstration projects are important not just for 
encouraging innovation, but also for promoting evaluation and increasing 
the likelihood that knowledge generated by the innovation diffuses across 
the country.  Some sort of evaluation component is typically part of waiver 
and demonstration programs.  In a previously funded series of malpractice-
related demonstration projects, for example, grant recipients were “required 
to submit patient safety data to [the federal Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality’s] network of patient safety databases” using pre-specified 
formats.136  This kind of requirement not only ensures the availability of data 
for direct evaluation, but also facilitates comparisons across different 
projects, by standardizing data collection.137 
The ACA imposes a number of waiver- and demonstration-related 
reporting requirements.  Any state that takes advantage of the ACA’s broad 
 
resources are devoted to congressionally mandated projects.”). 
 130.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(b)(3)(A) (2012); see 
also Barr et al., supra note 124, at 1305; Mechanic & Altman, supra note 122, at 773 (referring to 
neutrality requirements). 
 131.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
 132.  Barr et al., supra note 124, at 1305. 
 133.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(c) (2012). 
 134.  See Mechanic & Altman, supra note 122, at 772 (“This provision is critical, because the 
need for congressional approval has delayed or derailed past initiatives.”). 
 135.  The ACA contemplates that CMI will launch pilot programs testing both state-based reforms 
(such as state all-payer payment reform) and health care delivery reforms (such as payment reform 
for diagnostic imaging services).  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1315a(b)(2)(B)(vi), (xi) (2012). 
 136.  Fact Sheet: Patient Safety and Medical Liability Reform Demonstration, WHITE HOUSE 
(Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/fact-sheet-patient-safety-and-medical-
liability-reform-demonstration. 
 137.  See id. 
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waiver in order to implement the state’s own program for expanding 
coverage, for example, must submit periodic reports concerning program 
implementation, and the Secretary must conduct periodic evaluations of such 
programs.138  States seeking to participate in the ACA demonstration project 
involving bundled payments to Medicaid providers must provide “relevant 
data necessary to monitor outcomes, costs, and quality.”139 
The ACA requires evaluations of models tested by CMI.  Specifically, it 
authorizes the Secretary to impose data collection and reporting 
requirements on demonstration participants and requires the Secretary to 
analyze the “quality of care furnished under the model, including the 
measurement of patient-level outcomes and patient-centeredness criteria 
determined appropriate by the Secretary” and “the changes in spending 
under the applicable titles by reason of the model.”140  It also requires 
evaluation results to be made publicly available.141  These requirements will 
help to ensure an effectively functioning federal laboratory. 
2.  Federal Support for Delivery System Experimentation 
 In many ways, the federal support for delivery system experimentation 
resembles its support for state experimentation.  The ACA relies heavily on 
demonstration projects and pilot programs, for example, as mechanisms to 
promote innovation and assure evaluation.142  It establishes a pilot program 
on payment bundling under which a group of health care providers 
“including a hospital, a physician group, a skilled nursing facility, and a 
home health agency” would receive a bundled payment covering services 
delivered in conjunction with a patient’s episode of care, beginning several 
days before hospital admission and extending thirty days following a 
patient’s discharge.143  This kind of pilot program could address providers’ 
current disincentives to reduce treatment costs, an issue discussed in Part 
 
 138.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1332(a)(4)(B)(iv)–(v), 42 U.S.C. § 
18052(a)(4)(B)(iv)–(v) (2012). 
 139.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2704(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a note (2012). 
 140.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021(b)(4)(A)(i)–(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(b)(4) 
(2012) (the word “titles” is changed to “subchapters” in the U.S. Code version). 
 141.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(b)(4)(B) (2012). 
 142.  See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2704(a), 124 
Stat. 119, 323–24 (2010); id. § 3023. 
 143.  Id. § 3023(c)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
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III.B. 
The ACA also creates a demonstration program “to test a payment 
incentive and service delivery model that utilizes physician and nurse 
practitioner directed home-based primary care teams designed to reduce 
expenditures and improve health outcomes.”144  Many of the models that the 
ACA proposes for testing by CMI involve health care delivery reforms, so 
much of the discussion in Part III.C.1 is actually even more relevant for 
delivery system experimentation than for state experimentation.145    
Other ACA provisions, some of which build on earlier federal policies, 
are more squarely aimed at health care market features that undermine health 
care providers’ incentives to innovate.  Part III.B highlighted two such 
features: the difficulty of assessing health care quality and the fact that 
payment often does not reflect quality.  The ACA includes numerous 
provisions intended to enhance quality reporting.146  In addition to requiring 
reporting in connection with specific demonstration projects, it mandates the 
development and public reporting of health care quality measures more 
generally.147  In addition to potentially facilitating providers’ efforts to 
identify and address quality problems, public reporting may provide 
reputational and financial incentives to do so.148  The ACA also takes a more 
 
 144.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3024, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-5(a)(1) (2012). 
 145.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(b)(2)(B) (2012).  
Examples include “[c]ontracting directly with groups of providers of services and suppliers to 
promote innovative care delivery models, such as through risk-based comprehensive payment or 
salary-based payment,” and “[e]stablishing community-based health teams to support small-practice 
medical homes by assisting the primary care practitioner in chronic care management, including 
patient self-management, activities.”  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, § 3021(b)(2)(B)(ii), (viii), 124 Stat. 119, 390–91 (2010). 
 146.  See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3002, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4 (2012) 
(improvements to physician quality reporting); id. § 3004, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2012) (quality 
reporting for long-term care hospitals, inpatient rehabilitation hospitals, and hospice programs); id. 
§§ 3013–15 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. 299 (2012)) (provisions on quality 
measurement and public reporting). 
 147.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 3013–15, 124 Stat. 
119, 381–88 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. 299 (2012)) (provisions on quality 
measurement and public reporting).  
 148.  See Kristin Madison, The Law and Policy of Health Care Quality Reporting, 31 CAMPBELL 
L. REV. 215, 215–26 (2009) (discussing nature and benefits of report card use).  Congress did not 
identify the specific quality measures to be used for reporting or value-based payment purposes.  See 
cf. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2701, 124 Stat. 119, 317 
(2010) (“Adult health quality measures”).  With respect to public reporting, there is a statutory 
requirement that “[t]he Secretary shall report quality measures of process, structure, outcome, 
patients’ perspectives on care, efficiency, and costs of care that relate to services furnished in 
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direct route to incentivizing quality-enhancing delivery innovations: it 
contains pay-for-performance provisions that tie Medicare payments to 
quality measures for hospitals, physicians, skilled nursing facilities, and 
other providers.149  These provisions focus institutional attention on 
improving health care delivery, without dictating specific mechanisms for 
quality improvement, thus preserving health care providers’ ability to 
innovate. 
IV.  BUILDING A BETTER FEDERAL LABORATORY 
Permitting state policy variation, financing and conducting 
demonstration projects, addressing market information failures, and altering 
provider payment mechanisms are all good ways to foster innovation and 
evaluation in the health care system.  The federal government could do 
more, however, to build a federal laboratory.  This Part explores additional 
approaches to encouraging the development, evaluation, and diffusion of 
policies and practices that increase health care access, reduce cost, and 
enhance quality. 
A.  Policy Incentives 
Building on several years of federal experience with quality reporting 
and value-based purchasing, the ACA relies heavily on payment 
mechanisms to encourage delivery system reform.  By altering payment 
formulas, it incentivizes providers to identify and implement strategies for 
increasing efficiency or improving the quality of care.150 
 
inpatient settings in hospitals on the Internet website of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services.”  42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(B)(viii)(VII) (2012).  With respect to value-based payments 
to hospitals, the ACA requires that measures cover acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, 
pneumonia, surgeries (as measured by the Surgical Care Improvement Project), and infections (as 
measured by the HHS Action Plan to Prevent Healthcare-Associated Infections), as well as 
consumer views as represented in the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and 
Systems survey.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o)(2)(B)(i)(I) (2012). 
 149.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3001, 124 Stat. 119, 
122 (2010) (hospital value-based purchasing); id. § 3006 (skilled nursing facility and home health 
agency value-based purchasing); id. § 3007 (physician services value-based payment modifiers); id. 
§ 3008 (payment adjustments for hospital-acquired conditions). 
 150.  Regulations for Medicare’s hospital value-based purchasing program give a glimpse of how 
such incentives might be structured.  See generally Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Value-
Based Purchasing Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,490 (May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 422 
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 In theory, similar sorts of incentives could be used to encourage more 
innovation in state health policy.  Congress has often promoted the adoption 
of particular policies through its funding formulas.  One well-known 
example is its withholding of a portion of highway funds from states that 
permit the purchase of alcohol by people under the age of twenty-one.151  
Structurally, this sort of program could be said to resemble value-based 
purchasing programs that rely on process measures of quality.  The hospital 
value-based purchasing program incentivizes timely administration of 
antibiotics, a step that might improve treatment outcomes;152 the highway 
funding program incentivizes the adoption of a policy prohibiting alcohol 
sales to those under twenty-one, a step that might reduce highway accidents.  
This sort of program makes the most sense when the federal government has 
identified a policy change that it believes will benefit the public, but for 
some reason states have failed to adopt it on their own. 
When the best approach to achieving a policy objective is unclear, or 
when it varies across states, financial incentives tied to policy outcomes may 
be more appropriate.  One illustration of an outcome-based incentive can be 
found within the Race to the Top program for educational reform.  Financed 
by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the Race to the 
Top program offers over four billion dollars in grants to states choosing to 
adopt innovative programs to improve education.153  The application 
guidelines for the competitive grant program specify a variety of selection 
criteria.  Most are the equivalent of structure or process quality measures, 
although the application does not delineate specific steps that states must 
take.  For example, points are allotted for “[f]ully implementing a statewide 
longitudinal data system” and “[i]ntervening in the lowest-achieving 
 
& 480).  The regulations tie payment to process-related quality measures (such as whether 
antibiotics were received within one hour before surgery), as well as measures based on a consumer 
survey.  See id. at 26,515–16.  They will also include three outcome-based quality measures (such as 
thirty day mortality for heart attacks) in 2014.  Id. 
 151.  See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012) (“The Secretary shall withhold 10 per centum of the amount 
required to be apportioned to any State . . . in which the purchase or public possession in such State 
of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than twenty-one years of age is lawful.”). 
 152.  See generally, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HOSPITAL VALUE-BASED PURCHASING 
PROGRAM (2013), available at http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-
Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/Hospital_VBPurchasing_Fact_Sheet_ICN907664.pdf 
(explaining the benefits of the hospital value-based purchasing program). 
 153.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2009), 
available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf. 
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schools.”154  The application also refers to outcome measures: 30 of 500 
possible points are allotted for “[d]emonstrating significant progress in 
raising achievement and closing gaps” based on measures such as high 
school graduation rates and national testing results.155  In short, the Race to 
the Top program offers to state policymakers financial incentives based on 
structure, process, and outcome measures of educational quality. 
Within the health care area, the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA) offers a similar sort of performance 
bonus to states.156  To encourage greater enrollment of uninsured children in 
Medicaid, the legislation tied financial incentives both to the adoption of 
particular practices intended to increase enrollment and to the achievement 
of enrollment targets.157  Federal officials have described this incentive as a 
“first-of-its-kind payment incentive for states . . . that offset[s] some of the 
costs associated with states’ success in covering more children in 
Medicaid.”158  To be eligible for the bonus, states must implement five of 
eight specified practices, such as eliminating asset tests for eligibility, 
eliminating requirements for in-person interviews, and using a joint 
application for Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program.159  
States meeting these requirements could receive a bonus for every enrolled 
child above a target threshold; the target was calculated by first adjusting 
2007 enrollment by child population growth and then increasing this number 
by several percentage points.160  In 2011, nearly three hundred million 
dollars was awarded to twenty-three states that met the relevant criteria.161   
 
 154.  Id. at 3. 
 155.  Id. at 3, 7. 
 156.  Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-3, 123 
Stat. 8. 
 157.  See Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA), KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2009), http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/childrens-health-insurance-
program-reauthorization-act-of/ (describing CHIPRA). 
 158.  INSUREKIDSNOW.GOV, CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE REAUTHORIZATION ACT ONE 
YEAR LATER: CONNECTING KIDS TO COVERAGE 5 (2010), available at 
http://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/chipra-anniversary-report-final.pdf. 
 159.  Id. at 10 n.22. 
 160.  See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED & GEORGETOWN UNIV. HEALTH 
POLICY INST. CTR. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, CHIP TIPS: MEDICAID PERFORMANCE BONUS 2 
(2009), available at http://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Federal%20schip%20 
policy_chip%20tip%20perf.%20bonus.pdf. 
 161.  See Julian Pecquet, Obama Administration Awards $300 Million for Children’s Health 
Care, THE HILL (Dec. 28, 2011), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health-insurance/201581-
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There is no similar provision in the ACA for state health policy reform.  
The ACA encourages state innovation by giving states flexibility in 
implementing federal requirements and funding demonstration projects, but 
it does not rely on tailored financial incentives as a way to encourage the 
adoption or diffusion of innovative policies.  It is true that federal funding of 
the ACA’s programs will affect state policies, as federal funding directed to 
states always has.  To obtain Medicaid funding, for example, states must 
comply with federal mandates dictating the structure of their Medicaid 
programs.162  But these federal payments do not generally vary with state 
policy “processes” in the same way that reimbursement will vary with 
hospital health care delivery processes.  Nor does the ACA contain any 
provisions that link federal financial support specifically to state health 
policy outcomes. 
What might a federal incentive for state health policy adoption look 
like?  Consider health benefit exchanges.  Federal regulations could continue 
to define some basic structural features of health exchanges while preserving 
significant flexibility in order to accommodate innovation.  But Congress 
might simultaneously promise increased federal funding to states that find a 
way to increase the number of insured residents above a defined threshold, 
similar to the target already in place under CHIPRA.163  This approach 
would give states the regulatory flexibility that many of them have called 
for, while at the same time holding the states accountable for the policy 
objectives Congress sought to achieve through the ACA.164  Through the use 
 
obama-administration-awards-300-million-for-childrens-healthcare. 
 162.  See 42 U.S.C. 1396(b) (2012) (“Payment to States”). 
 163.  See supra notes 156–60 and accompanying text. 
 164.  Another example of an area in which the federal government could tie payment to quality 
metrics is Medicaid.  Under the health reform statute, private Medicare Advantage plans will receive 
payments based on their “star ratings,” which are in turn based on measures related to the provision 
of care, such as screening and vaccination rates, as well as measures related to customer service and 
member satisfaction.  See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1102(b)–(c), 42 
U.S.C. § 1395w-23 (2012); see also REACHING FOR THE STARS: QUALITY RATINGS FOR MEDICARE 
ADVANTAGE PLANS, 2011, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2011), available at 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8151.pdf (describing the rating system).  
If similar types of ratings were extended to Medicaid programs, then program administrators would 
have a financial incentive to focus on areas in need of improvement.  Some Medicaid programs have 
already begun to institute reimbursement mechanisms for Medicaid providers that take into account 
quality metrics.  See generally KATHRYN KUHMERKER & THOMAS HARTMAN, COMMONWEALTH 
FUND, PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE IN STATE MEDICAID PROGRAMS (2007), available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Fund-Reports/2007/Apr/Pay-for-Performance-in-
State-Medicaid-Programs--A-Survey-of-State-Medicaid-Directors-and-Programs.aspx.  For an 
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of policy incentives, the federal government could increase the reward that 
individual states receive from effective policy reform, helping states 
overcome barriers that might otherwise impede innovation. 
Outcome-oriented incentives in the state policy setting, like outcome-
based quality measures in the health care delivery setting, would raise many 
substantive policy concerns.165  Identifying an easily collectible and 
verifiable metric that accurately reflects policy objectives may be difficult.  
An incentive that directs focus toward a particular objective may divert 
focus from other, equally desirable objectives.  States may engage in 
practices that help them achieve the defined target but undermine other 
policy goals.  The details of how targets are defined will make it easier for 
some states to achieve the targets than others, inviting political conflict over 
target criteria.  Note, however, that given the tremendous variation in state 
circumstances, any policy directed at states could be said to impact one state 
more than another.  These concerns about the implications of outcome-
oriented incentives suggest that the domains in which such incentives might 
be appropriate are limited, but incentives nevertheless may have the 
potential to encourage innovative state efforts to achieve federally defined 
policy objectives. 
B.  Regulatory Variation and Regulatory Menus 
When federal policymaking displaces state laboratories, it not only shuts 
down a major source of innovation, but also eliminates the variation that so 
often provides a foundation for evaluating an innovation’s effects.  Waivers 
and demonstration projects can help to address this problem, as can various 
statistical methods of evaluation, such as differences-in-differences analyses 
that compare the differences in pre-policy and post-policy outcomes between 
groups differentially impacted by a policy.  But another approach would be 
to adopt a federal mandate that preserves variation in a purposeful way.  As 
Abramowicz, Ayres, and Listokin suggest, randomization is one way to 
 
example of a program supporting value-based purchasing, see Value-Based Purchasing, 
MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/State-Resource-Center/MAC-Learning-Collaboratives/ 
Value-Based-Purchasing.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).  Presumably, federal subsidies tied to 
metrics would encourage more such contracting. 
 165.  See generally Madison, supra note 148, at 226–36 (discussing problematic aspects of quality 
report cards). 
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build a foundation for studying the effects of policy approaches.166 
Consider, for example, the ACA’s menu labeling requirements.167  Just a 
few years before the ACA was enacted, states such as California168 and 
Maine169 and cities such as New York170 and Philadelphia171 mandated that 
certain restaurants include nutrition-related information on their menus.  A 
few studies have now been published assessing the impact of these early 
reporting requirements.172  The details of the study designs vary, but most 
share a common structure: they compare pre-labeling behavior with post-
labeling behavior in areas subject to a menu labeling requirement, while also 
examining behavior in areas not subject to the requirement.  Information 
from mandate-free areas is important because it reveals trends influencing 
behavior apart from the labeling requirement.  Because the ACA imposes a 
requirement for chain restaurants to display calorie information 
nationwide,173 preempting state and local laws with different nutrition 
labeling requirements,174 it may eliminate these mandate-free areas, 
complicating future research efforts in this area.175  In short, while research 
 
 166.  See Abramowicz et al., supra note 50, at 974–1005 (discussing how randomization might be 
incorporated into policies).  
 167.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012).  
 168.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114094 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
 169.  See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2500-A (West, Westlaw through 2013 1st Reg. Sess. and 
1st Spec. Sess. of 126th Leg.). 
 170.  N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE § 81.50 (2014). 
 171.  PHILA., PA., HEALTH CODE § 6-308 (2010). 
 172.  See, e.g., Bryan Bollinger et al., Calorie Posting in Chain Restaurants, 3 AM. ECON. J.: 
ECON. POL’Y 91, 92 (2011) (finding that after calories were posted in compliance with the New 
York City menu mandate, average calories per transaction at Starbucks fell by 6%); Brian Elbel et 
al., Calorie Labeling and Food Choices: A First Look at the Effects on Low-Income People in New 
York City, 28 HEALTH AFF. w1110, w1117 (2009) (failing to find that menu labeling changed 
purchasing patterns); Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Mandatory Menu Labeling in One Fast-Food Chain 
in King County, Washington, 40 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 122, 126 (2011) (finding that menu 
labeling did not affect purchases).  
 173.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b), 42 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5) (2012). 
 174.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(c), 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(4) (2012); U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REGARDING THE 
EFFECT OF SECTION 4205 OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010 ON 
STATE AND LOCAL MENU AND VENDING MACHINE LABELING LAWS (2010), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/Labeling
Nutrition/ucm223408.htm [hereinafter Guidance for Industry]. 
 175.  FDA regulations allow states and localities to petition for exemptions from preemption, so 
some variation in labeling requirements is possible.  See Guidance for Industry, supra note 174 
(stating that “[s]tate and local governments cannot directly or indirectly impose any nutrition 
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on the effectiveness of labeling will certainly continue, the ACA’s push 
toward uniformity will increase the difficulty of discerning the effects of 
menu labeling requirements. 
How might this result have been avoided?  In theory, Congress could 
have mandated a gradual implementation of nationwide labeling 
requirements, rather than imposing an immediate, universal mandate.  
Researchers could then try to discern the impact of reporting by comparing 
early-mandate areas to late-mandate areas.  A variation on this approach 
would be to mandate nationwide disclosure, but to vary its content.  
Restaurants in some areas could be required to disclose calories, for 
example, while restaurants in other areas could be required to disclose 
calories and sodium content.  Researchers could then examine whether the 
disclosure of sodium had no effect, had the intended effect of reducing 
sodium consumption, or had an unintended effect, such as an increase in 
calorie consumption, which might occur if restaurant goers’ attention to 
caloric content were diverted as a result of information overload.  After a 
few years of variation, regulatory uniformity could be imposed. 
Whether the staggered mandate approach would successfully establish 
the necessary conditions for plausible inference depends on many factors.  
One such factor is the procedure used to ensure variation.  Assigning 
implementation dates or reporting requirements by any mechanism other 
than random selection increases the likelihood that differences in 
comparison groups stem from differences in their characteristics rather than 
differences in the regulations imposed.  A second factor is the behavior of 
the regulated entities.  National restaurant chains may oppose staggered 
mandates out of a desire to preserve national uniformity in their restaurants.  
If such a scheme were nonetheless implemented, chains may choose to adopt 
the more stringent reporting requirements nationwide, undermining research 
 
labeling requirements on chain retail food establishments that are not ‘identical to’ requirements 
imposed by section 4205” but that “FDA’s regulations, at 21 C.F.R. 100.1, allow any State or 
locality to petition FDA for an exemption from preemption”).  The regulations state that “[t]he 
agency may grant the exemption . . . if the agency finds that the State requirement will not cause any 
food to be in violation of any applicable requirement under Federal law, will not unduly burden 
interstate commerce, and is designed to address a particular need for information that is not met by 
the preemptive Federal requirement.”  21 C.F.R. § 100.1(a)(2) (2013).  It is not clear, however, how 
many communities will take advantage of this option.  In addition, communities that seek 
exemptions are likely to be quite different from those that do not, undermining efforts to use such 
variations to isolate labeling’s effects from effects associated with characteristics of communities 
that adopt labeling. 
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efforts that depend on the continued existence of a robust control group.176  
A third consideration is that legislators might be reluctant to adopt staggered 
mandates because they would clearly evidence a willingness to impose 
mandates despite the existence of considerable uncertainty about their 
effects. 
Even if it is not feasible to directly impose variation via statute, it may 
be possible to obtain variation via regulation.  Consider menu labeling once 
again.  In the course of implementing the menu labeling requirements, the 
FDA has had to make numerous choices about regulatory details, some of 
which may influence labeling’s effectiveness.  In the preamble to its 
proposed menu labeling regulations, for example, the FDA explained that in 
its earlier draft guidance, it had recommended that a food’s calorie 
information have the “same color and contrasting background as the 
standard menu item.”177  It then noted that it had received comments 
suggesting that this approach would make calorie information less prominent 
and responded by proposing that calories must be posted “in the same color, 
or a color at least as conspicuous as the name of the associated standard 
menu item, and with the same contrasting background as the name of the 
associated standard menu item.”178  The FDA also discussed such quandaries 
as whether to require listings of average calories or ranges of calories when 
foods have multiple flavors or varieties, as well as what kind of statement 
about daily caloric consumption might be best suited for providing context 
for the calorie listings.179  These choices are quandaries because they might 
have an impact on restaurant goers, but the nature of their impact is unclear.       
 
 176.  An effort to prohibit restaurants from disclosing additional nutritional information about 
their food, in order to preserve full regulatory variation, might be met with a First Amendment 
challenge.  Under the Central Hudson test for governmental restrictions on commercial speech, the 
analysis would seem to turn on whether the government’s interest in experimentation is substantial, 
whether the prohibition directly advances this interest, and whether the regulation is narrowly 
tailored to serve this interest.  See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 
447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).   
 177.  Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and Similar Food 
Establishments, 76 Fed. Reg. 19,192, 19,206 (proposed Apr. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pts. 11 and 101). 
 178.  See id. at 19,233. 
 179.  See id. at 19,207–09 (discussing calorie averages and ranges); see also id. at 19,210.  Two of 
the statements considered by the FDA were “[u]sing 2,000 calories per day as a reference point, 
consider how the menu item you select fits within your total daily calorie needs, which may be 
higher or lower depending on age, physical activity, gender” and “[a] 2,000 calorie daily diet is used 
as the basis for general nutrition advice; however, individual calorie needs may vary.”  Id. at 19,210. 
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Regulators could try to resolve a few of these quandaries through 
regulatory variation.  Imagine that instead of requiring a color that is “at 
least as conspicuous,”180 or requiring the presentation of calorie ranges, or 
selecting the shortest possible disclosure statement, the FDA conducted a 
multiyear randomized controlled trial in which different restaurants were 
required to comply with different requirements.  For example, some 
restaurants might initially be required to present calorie ranges for different 
flavors, while others would be required to present averages.  Information 
about consumer understanding and consumption decisions could then be 
collected and evaluated, allowing regulators to make a more informed 
selection of a particular approach to presenting calorie information.  The 
FDA could randomize its requirements across states or across metropolitan 
areas on the grounds that variation would permit greater study of the impact 
of different features of menu labeling in a real-world setting. 
Alternatively, it might be possible for the FDA to create a limited 
“regulatory menu” from which regulated entities could choose the regulatory 
approach they preferred.  The idea of a regulatory menu is not new.  Under 
the federal “meaningful use” regulations, for example, providers seeking 
financial incentive payments in connection with their adoption of electronic 
health records must meet criteria defined by regulation, but must also meet 
five additional objectives that they can select from a longer list of 
possibilities.181  However, the purpose of the meaningful use menu of 
objectives is to allow flexibility for providers, not to create a potential 
foundation for research.182  By contrast, the purpose of the regulatory menu 
suggested here would be to allow for the creation of a limited number of 
comparison groups to facilitate research on the effects of regulatory choices.   
If the regulatory choices were structured in such a way that different 
entities would choose to subject themselves to different regulations, the 
resulting variation might permit further study.  Regulatory menus would 
make the most sense in situations in which the likely impact of a particular 
approach is so unclear that the resulting “assignment” of entities to 
regulatory approaches is essentially random.  For example, some restaurants 
might have a slight preference for the shorter statement about daily caloric 
 
 180.  Id. at 19,206. 
 181.  See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 44,314, 44,327 (July 28, 2010) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts 412, 413, 422, and 495). 
 182.  Id. (“We believe that establishing both a core and a menu set adds flexibility and allows the 
minimum statutory set to be met.”). 
[Vol. 41: 765, 2014] Building a Better Laboratory 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
805 
consumption because it fits their existing menu format better, while others 
might have a slight preference for the longer statement because they believe 
a longer statement would cause information overload and thus would 
weaken the impact of calorie disclosures.  As long as these two groups are 
not systematically different (beyond their relative needs for menu space), 
their choices would generate data that would help to inform regulators about 
the implications of daily intake statements.   
From the perspective of a researcher seeking to gather information about 
the impact of a regulation, regulatory menus would not be as attractive as 
regulation with variation.  The worry is that whatever factors lead to an 
entity’s choice of regulatory option may also contribute to regulatory 
outcomes in unobservable ways, obscuring the effect of the regulation 
itself.183  However, menus do have the advantage of preserving some 
flexibility for regulated entities in contexts where regulators’ preferences for 
a particular approach are not strong. 
Like state laboratory-based experimentation, regulatory menu-based 
experimentation could potentially generate useful information because of the 
variation it allows.  But unlike state laboratories, regulatory menus are 
subject to the control of a single experimenter.  The FDA could maintain the 
same presentation format across all menu choices, but vary the daily intake 
statement; alternatively, it could vary the presentation format, but maintain 
uniformity in the daily intake statement.  A state laboratory experiment 
might produce fifty menu formats, while a regulatory menu constrains the 
choices to two.  Such constraints have the benefit of increasing the number 
of jurisdictions that would take any given approach, improving regulators’ 
ability to make meaningful comparisons across jurisdictions.  If each 
jurisdiction were to implement its own unique menu labeling law, as 
sometimes happens when states act as laboratories, then it would be difficult 
to sort out statistically which particular features of the labeling laws were 
generating each jurisdiction’s outcomes.184 
The ACA’s preemption of state and local menu labeling requirements 
 
 183.  If the groups were systematically different, but in ways that could be observed, it may be 
possible to account for these differences in evaluating the results of the experiment. 
 184.  For an examination of variation in state menu labeling requirements, see Ashley Arthur, 
Note, Combating Obesity: Our Country’s Need for a National Standard to Replace the Growing 
Patchwork of Local Menu Labeling Laws, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 305, 313–20 (2010) 
(deconstructing menu labeling requirements in New York, California, Washington, Pennsylvania, 
and Indiana). 
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suggests that the legislation was intended to achieve national uniformity in 
labeling mandates, facilitating national chain restaurants’ efforts to maintain 
menu consistency.185  Mandated variation would be inconsistent with that 
intent, although only in the short term while experimental data was being 
gathered.  Regulatory menus would be less problematic if all restaurants in a 
chain were permitted to choose the same menu option.  The main argument 
here, however, is not that regulatory variation is feasible or even desirable in 
the case of federal menu labeling requirements. Instead, the argument is 
simply that it may sometimes be desirable to enact federal statutes that 
permit regulatory variation or regulatory menus, at least for a limited period 
of time, in order to improve researchers’ ability to conduct careful studies of 
regulatory effects. 
C.  Conditioned Waivers  
Regulatory variation facilitates evaluation by giving federal regulators 
the systematic variation they need to conduct their own policy experiments.  
These approaches make the most sense when regulators have already settled 
on a short list of reasonable, well specified policy choices, but are uncertain 
about which policy would generate the best result: should a shorter daily 
calorie intake statement be used or a longer, more detailed one?  In many 
settings, however, particularly ones involving the most innovative policies, it 
will be difficult to develop a short list.  In addition, political or practical 
concerns may mean that federal policymakers are reluctant to take 
responsibility for this type of broad experiment.  An alternative approach 
would be to encourage voluntary experimentation and evaluation on a 
smaller scale, via conditioned waivers.  Regulatory waivers could be 
conditioned on regulated entities’ willingness to design, participate in, and 
disclose to regulators (or the public) the results of a study, with the basic 
parameters defined either as part of the waiver application process or 
through criteria specified by regulation. 
Accountable care organizations (ACOs), which have been described as 
“networks of physicians and other providers that could work together to 
improve the quality of health care services and reduce costs for a defined 
 
 185.  Cf. Guidance for Industry, supra note 174. 
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patient population,”186 provide an illustration of circumstances under which 
conditioned waivers might be useful.  Under the ACA, ACOs that meet 
certain requirements are entitled to keep a portion of any Medicare savings 
they are able to generate through their management of care for a defined 
group of Medicare beneficiaries.187  To function effectively, ACOs may need 
to form relationships and engage in practices that implicate existing fraud 
and abuse laws.188  The ACA addresses this issue by giving the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services the authority to waive certain fraud and abuse 
statutory requirements “as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of 
this section.”189 
The ACA did not specify the form that waivers should take.190  In 
anticipation of the development of waiver-related regulations, health care 
practitioners discussed a number of options.191  One approach would be to 
grant waivers based on a review of the risks and benefits of individual 
proposed arrangements.192  The Office of the Inspector General of the 
Department of Health and Human Services has historically engaged in a 
similar process, in which it reviews potentially problematic arrangements 
described by providers, considers their purposes and risks, and then 
determines whether their adoption would be grounds for administrative 
sanction.193  This case-by-case approach has the advantage of allowing 
regulators to scrutinize the details of particular arrangements, facilitating 
 
 186.  Mark Merlis, Accountable Care Organizations (Updated), HEALTH AFFAIRS (Aug. 13, 
2010), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=23. 
 187.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2012). 
 188.  See Merlis, supra note 186 (discussing legal barriers ACOs may face). 
 189.  42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(f) (2012). 
 190.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
 191.  See generally DOUGLAS A. HASTINGS ET AL., AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, WAIVERS 
UNDER THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM: AN OUTLINE OF THE OPTIONS (2010), 
available at http://www.healthlawyers.org/hlresources/PI/Policy/Pages/ACOWaivers-Options 
Outline.aspx. 
 192.  See id. at 4–5. 
 193.  See Advisory Opinions,, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL: U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/advisory-opinions/index.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2014).  An 
example of a response: “[w]e conclude that . . . while the Arrangement could potentially generate 
prohibited remuneration under the anti-kickback statute if the requisite intent to induce or reward 
referrals of Federal health care program business were present, the Office of Inspector General . . . 
will not impose administrative sanctions . . . .”  Re: OIG Advisory Op. No. 11-16 (Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs. Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/ 
2011/AdvOpn11-16.pdf. 
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more concrete assessments of risks and benefits.194  This approach also 
brings to everyone’s attention specific examples of arrangements that might 
appeal to other providers and examples that might be helpful for 
policymakers refining fraud and abuse laws in the future.195  It has the 
disadvantage of imposing significant costs on both applicants and 
regulators.196 
A second approach is to issue blanket waivers for particular types of 
arrangements.197  Regulators would describe the particular setting in which 
the waiver would apply, enumerating any criteria that must be satisfied 
beyond the general criteria for participation in the ACO program.  This 
approach may be less costly for both ACOs and regulators, since there is no 
need to develop or review detailed, formal requests for waivers.  It allows 
for a wide variety of ACO arrangements, and it provides a measure of 
regulatory certainty for entities considering forming new arrangements.  For 
regulators, the challenge in creating appropriate waiver criteria is to 
anticipate the types of arrangements that ACOs might want to adopt under a 
waiver and then select criteria that will ensure that the newly allowed 
arrangements will promote the ACO program’s objectives without raising 
the concerns underlying the fraud and abuse laws. 
Federal regulators decided to adopt the blanket waiver approach.198  
They issued an interim final rule defining five sets of circumstances in 
which entities establishing or operating ACOs would be entitled to waivers 
of certain fraud and abuse laws.199  Mindful of the risks that such blanket 
waivers might create, they indicated that the waivers would be narrowed 
over time  
unless the Secretary determines that information gathered through 
monitoring or other means suggests that such waivers have not had 
the unintended effect of shielding abusive arrangements.  In 
 
 194.  See HASTINGS ET AL., supra note 191, at 4–5. 
 195.  See id. 
 196.  See id.  The exhaustive attention given to one particular case is not a feasible standard for 
every case.  See, e.g., id. 
 197.  See id. at 5–6. 
 198.  See generally Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings 
Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,992, 67,999 (Nov. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-11-02/pdf/2011-27460.pdf (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. ch. 
V). 
 199.  See generally id. 
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particular, if we find that undesirable effects (for example, aberrant 
patterns of utilization) have occurred because of the waivers, we 
will revise this IFC to address those problems by narrowing the 
waivers.200 
Regulators will be able to monitor many types of utilization based on 
the claims data generated as part of the Medicare program.201  They will also 
have access to information about treatment quality that ACOs are required to 
report.202  Attributing abnormal utilization patterns or undesirable quality 
effects to abusive arrangements, however, would require a detailed follow-
up investigation into the nature of the arrangements used and an analysis of 
potential links between the arrangements, health care costs, and outcomes.203 
To facilitate both innovation and evaluation in health care delivery, 
regulators might have instead taken a third approach: a waiver conditioned 
on an entity’s willingness to serve as a laboratory.  By conditioning waivers 
on a commitment to data reporting, analysis, or both, regulators could shift 
at least some of the responsibility for evaluation of promising but potentially 
problematic arrangements to the parties involved, while simultaneously 
allowing for considerable flexibility in ACO implementation. 
Consider the waiver granted for ACO beneficiary inducements.204  To 
improve patient health and reduce expenditure growth, and to fulfill the 
statutory requirement of promoting patient engagement,205 ACOs may want 
to use financial incentives that encourage behavioral change.  ACOs might 
want to reward patients for adherence to a physician’s recommended 
treatment regimen, for example.  But ACOs might also be tempted to reward 
patients for seeking care from ACO providers—a practice that might 
improve patient health by facilitating ACOs’ efforts to manage care 
internally, but might also interfere with competition with non-ACO 
 
 200.  Id. at 68,008 (footnote omitted). 
 201.  See id. at 68,004, 68,008. 
 202.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3022, 42 U.S.C. 1395jjj(b)(3) (2012). 
 203.  See, e.g., Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 
76 Fed. Reg. 67,992, 68,008–09 (Nov. 2, 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2011-11-02/pdf/2011-27460.pdf (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. ch. V). 
 204.  See Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 76 
Fed. Reg. 67992, 67,993, 67,995, 67,999 (Nov. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-11-02/pdf/2011-27460.pdf (interim final rule with comment 
period; to be codified at 42 C.F.R. ch. V). 
 205.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act  § 3022, 42 U.S.C. 1395jjj(b)(2)(G) (2012). 
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providers.  In addition, if it increases the total amount of care sought, the 
practice might increase Medicare program costs.  To avoid these sorts of 
negative effects, an existing federal statute prohibits remuneration to 
Medicare beneficiaries that is “likely to influence [the beneficiary] to order 
or receive [a service] from a particular provider” if the service is covered by 
Medicare.206 
Striking a balance between the potential risks and benefits of beneficiary 
inducement, the ACO regulations allow ACOs to provide beneficiaries free 
or reduced-price goods or services, but only under specified 
circumstances.207  Among other requirements, the goods or services must be 
in-kind, have a reasonable connection to the patient’s care, and be preventive 
or advance one of four clinical goals, such as adherence to a treatment 
regime.208  In adopting this rule, regulators rejected suggestions that ACOs 
should not receive a special waiver for beneficiary inducements.209  They 
also rejected suggestions that ACOs should be permitted to use other kinds 
of financial incentives, such as reduced or eliminated patient cost-sharing 
requirements.210  In addition, regulators left some specific questions to be 
answered, such as whether “preventive care” should be defined by 
regulation.211    
By structuring the ACO program rules and related waivers differently, 
regulators could have allowed for more innovation in the nature of 
incentives offered and more information about these incentives’ effects.  
Imagine, for example, a waiver that would permit ACOs to use incentives of 
the sort permitted under the actual regulations, but only for a random subset 
of the beneficiaries assigned to them.  Or, alternatively, imagine a waiver 
that would permit ACOs to eliminate co-payments for a subset of their 
 
 206.  42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(5) (2012). 
 207.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6)(G), (H) (2012). 
 208.  See Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care 
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,958 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425).  The 
interim final rule for ACO waivers contained the same provisions.  See Medicare Program; Final 
Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,992, 68,001 (Nov. 2, 
2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-11-02/pdf/2011-27460.pdf (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. ch. V). 
 209.  See Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 76 
Fed. Reg. 67,992, 67,999 (Nov. 2, 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-11-
02/pdf/2011-27460.pdf (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. ch. V). 
 210.  See id. 
 211.  See id. at 68,007. 
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patients to encourage adherence, but only if they provided a similarly valued 
in-kind incentive for adherence by a different subset of patients.   
In either case, the ACO could be required to specify the precise nature 
of the incentives involved, define the group of patients eligible for the 
incentives, and identify the patients who actually received these incentives.  
It could further be required to identify and report on clinical measures that 
would allow for assessment of whether the incentives had had the intended 
health effect.  HHS could then supplement this patient-specific data with 
quality and utilization data it already collects to determine whether the 
incentive seems to have had unintended effects.  Essentially, the ACO could 
be asked to randomize its patients, then pass along the data generated by the 
experiment as a condition of receiving a waiver of fraud and abuse laws 
otherwise applicable to its use of incentives. 
A permutation on this proposal would be to allow ACOs—perhaps 
ACOs in different geographic market areas—to form coalitions to apply for 
waivers.  Waivers could be granted on the condition that coalition members 
agree to randomization of  incentive use among participating ACOs.  This 
approach would be more difficult to coordinate and perhaps less attractive to 
ACOs concerned about being randomized to the control group, but it would 
allow for consistency among an ACO’s assigned beneficiaries.  
A conditioned waiver that takes this form would offer some advantages 
over existing approaches to eliciting information about beneficiary 
inducements.  Under existing regulations, ACOs are required to “define, 
establish, implement, evaluate, and periodically update processes” to 
“[p]romote patient engagement.”212  The shared savings program application 
requires ACOs to submit narratives describing how the ACO will complete 
these tasks.213  Federal regulators may therefore have some access to 
information about incentives that ACOs plan to use.  This information, 
however, may not be sufficiently detailed to allow for clear evaluation or 
provided in a format that would allow for straightforward aggregation of 
data across ACOs.  ACOs may be required to undertake evaluations, but the 
regulations neither specify the nature of the evaluation nor require reporting 
 
 212.  42 C.F.R. § 425.112(b) (2013). 
 213.  See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM APPLICATION 18 (2012), available at 
https://www.cms.gov/sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/Medicare_Shared_Savings_Program_Appli
cation_2012.pdf. 
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of evaluation results.214  A conditioned waiver could be used to make more 
meaningful data available to regulators in forms that could be used to 
perform broader evaluations.  At the same time, conditioned waivers offer 
some advantages over traditional, formal demonstration projects in that they 
would allow for broader participation and more flexibility in the 
arrangements adopted. 
Another example of an area in which waivers conditioned on 
experimentation might be useful involves a different type of incentive: 
employer incentives for healthy behaviors.  A number of employers would 
like to offer wellness incentives through their health plans, such as rewards 
for employees who reach a target cholesterol level.215  Incentives have the 
potential to promote health, but they also have the potential to discriminate 
against the unhealthy and make insurance unaffordable.216  In recognition of 
both the benefits and risks of wellness incentives, the ACA allows incentives 
tied to standards based on health-related factors, but limits their use.217  One 
such limit is that, in the aggregate, these wellness rewards cannot exceed 
thirty percent of the total cost of insurance coverage.218  But the statute also 
contemplates the possibility of relaxing this limit: it grants the Secretaries of 
Labor, Health and Human Services, and the Treasury the authority to raise 
this limit to fifty percent “if the Secretaries determine that such an increase 
is appropriate.”219 
How might the Secretaries decide whether the increase is “appropriate”? 
The Secretaries could solicit comments on the potential costs and benefits of 
increasing the threshold.  Insurers, employers, patient advocates, and 
researchers in the field could relay their opinions about the actual impact of 
the current threshold and predictions about the possible impact of a higher 
threshold.  The ACA, however, does not call for a demonstration project in 
which the higher threshold would actually be tested.  If regulators were able 
(at least temporarily) to condition the availability of the fifty percent 
 
 214.  See generally 42 C.F.R. § 425.112 (2013). 
 215.  See Heather Baird, Note, Health Compromise: Reconciling Wellness Program Financial 
Incentives with Health Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1474, 1488–89 (2013). 
 216.  See Kristin M. Madison, Kevin G. Volpp & Scott D. Halpern, The Law, Policy, and Ethics 
of Employers’ Use of Financial Incentives to Improve Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 450, 451–54 
(2011). 
 217.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2705, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j) (2012). 
 218.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2705, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (2012). 
 219.  Id. 
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threshold on participation in a randomized trial (either among one firm’s 
employees or across a coalition of firms), as well as on reporting of the 
nature of incentives used and the relevant outcome measures, they could 
generate more reliable information about the impact of higher thresholds.  
There are both legal and practical impediments to this sort of arrangement,220 
but when the implications of such a significant change in regulation are 
unclear, the arrangement could provide very useful information while 
limiting the population exposed to the risks.  Ultimately, the Secretaries 
increased the ceiling to fifty percent for certain programs targeting tobacco 
use, but referenced other regulations, rather than empirical evidence, as the 
basis for their decision.221   
Federal and state governments impose many different types of reporting 
requirements, and many government programs, including waiver programs, 
require some sort of reporting as a condition of participation.222  A waiver 
explicitly conditioned on experimentation, however, might help build a 
stronger foundation for generating evidence on the impact of specific policy 
approaches.  The federal government has shown a willingness to condition 
policies on systematic data collection or experimentation in the past.  Under 
the Medicare program’s coverage with evidence development policy, for 
example, Medicare pays for certain services only for patients participating in 
a registry or clinical trial involving those services.223  Treating 
experimentation as a condition for a waiver might generate useful 
information in a wider set of policy domains.224 
Broader implementation of conditioned waivers would involve many 
challenges.  If the conditions for waivers go beyond reporting requirements 
to include some sort of randomization in exposure to a particular program, 
policy, or practice, questions of ethics and equity will invariably arise.  
 
 220.  See Madison et al., supra note 216, at 463–65 (describing legal and practical impediments to 
research on employer use of incentives). 
 221.  Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. 
33,157, 33,166-67 (June 3, 2013), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/06/03/ 
2013-12916/incentives-for-nondiscriminatory-wellness-programs-in-group-health-plans. 
 222.  See discussion of Section 1115 waivers in Part III.A. 
 223.  See Steven D. Pearson, Franklin G. Miller & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Medicare’s Requirement 
for Research Participation as a Condition of Coverage: Is It Ethical?, 296 JAMA 988, 988–89 
(2006) (describing coverage with evidence development policy).  
 224.  Several policy analysts have suggested that CMS adopt an “innovation with evidence 
development” approach to implementing system innovation.  Guterman et al., supra note 125, at 
1190–91. 
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Some patients may be upset if they do not qualify for incentives, while 
others do.  Critiques of Medicare’s coverage with evidence development 
policy have raised questions both about fairness generally and about the 
need to treat aspects of the policy as research—a classification that would 
bring with it a mandate for informed consent as well as a host of other 
requirements.225  Regulatory and policy experimentation, like medical 
experimentation, raises many ethical issues.226  The fact that under the 
conditioned waiver approach, the experiment would be conducted by the 
regulated entity, rather than directly by the regulator, would not eliminate 
those concerns and may even exacerbate them. 
Conditioned waivers could also be burdensome, particularly relative to a 
policy such as the blanket waiver for ACO beneficiary inducement, which 
requires neither an application nor waiver-specific reporting.  Waivers that 
allow for a lot of flexibility and involve minimal oversight reduce burdens 
on both regulators and regulated entities.  But the more attention regulators 
devote to crafting reporting and other requirements, whether through blanket 
waivers or case-by-case consideration of waiver applications, the higher the 
likely quality of the resulting evaluation.  Ultimately, the benefits of more 
and better information must be weighed against the risks of discouraging 
waiver requests and chilling innovation.  Conditioned waivers will not 
always be an attractive regulatory approach, but in areas where the need for 
additional information is particularly acute, they may be worthwhile. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act facilitates 
experimentation among both states and providers by preserving flexibility, 
supporting demonstration programs, and altering incentives.  At the same 
time, however, the federal government could do more to promote 
innovation, systematic evaluation, and widespread dissemination of findings.  
By tying funding to policy outcomes, making use of regulatory variation, 
and conditioning waivers on systematic evaluation, the federal government 
could improve the performance of the nation as a laboratory.   
 
 225.  See Pearson et al., supra note 223, at 989–90. 
 226.  See Abramowicz et al., supra note 50, at 963–74 (discussing ethical and equality issues 
implicated by randomizing law).  See generally ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL 
EXPERIMENTATION (Alice M. Rivlin & P. Michael Timpane eds., 1975) (exploring ethical issues in 
social experimentation). 
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This Article used health-related examples to illustrate each of these 
policy approaches.  Information failures and other flaws that plague health 
care markets, along with the significant federal role in financing health care, 
make the health area especially well-suited for federal initiatives designed to 
enhance experimentation.  But these same approaches could be applied to 
other areas of policy, too.  In enacting regulations, regulators often must 
decide on a regulatory approach with limited information about the potential 
impact of their choices.  Scholars have called for retrospective evaluation of 
regulations,227 and an executive order states as a general principle that the 
regulatory system “must measure . . . the actual results of regulatory 
requirements.”228  Regulating with variation could help support measurement 
efforts, regardless of the particular policy area affected.229 
There would undoubtedly be many policy, political, and practical 
challenges involved in building a better federal laboratory, whether through 
the approaches suggested in this Article or others.  But given the potential 
benefits of health system experimentation, it is important to begin to 
confront these challenges. 
  
 
 227.  See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Federal Regulations: Let’s Review the Rules, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 
29, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/29/opinion/la-oe-coglianese-regulations-20110429. 
 228.  Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). 
 229.  Cary Coglianese notes that “[t]o do retrospective evaluation well, agencies must engage in 
advance planning: making early decisions about how data will be defined and collected over time 
and what relevant control groups might be used for making comparisons.”  Coglianese, supra note 
227.  Regulatory variation could be part of this sort of advance planning process. 
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